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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I explore early-stage social ventures’ resource acquisition, the first 
CEO selection, as well as how funding foundations supporting early-stage social ventures 
overcome challenges emerge from the economic crisis. Social ventures are organizations 
established by social entrepreneurs who seek to create social impact by providing 
systematic and sustainable solutions. They pursue the integration of social mission and 
economic goal in organizations’ core, thus are distinguished from both commercial 
organizations and nonprofits. Successful acquisition of seed capital and the first CEO 
selection are crucial milestones for social ventures to survive and flourish. The proposed 
model in Chapter 2 suggested factors of social ventures that affect impact investor’s 
eventual investment decision. It explicates how characteristics of a core founder, a 
founding team, and a social venture relate to each other and contribute to the increasing 
possibility of seed capital acquisition. Chapter 3 of this dissertation examines the first 
CEO selection of social venture. I empirically tested hypotheses using a dataset of 261 
social entrepreneurs from 108 social ventures and found that previous working 
experience in social mission-oriented organizations is crucial for being assigned as the 
first CEO. Additionally, previous working experience in commercial firms contributes to 
only female social entrepreneurs’ possibility of becoming the first CEO. In Chapter 4, I 
xi 
 
shift the focus to impact investors and explore the survival strategy of a funding 
foundation, Echoing Green, in response to financial challenges during the economic 
downturn in 2008. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Social ventures entail the application of business models to resolve social 
problems, such as poverty, food insecurity, and pollution (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Wry & 
York, 2017). The joint pursuit of social mission and financial goal distinguishes social 
ventures from both commercial ventures where prioritize economic profits and nonprofits 
that solely rely on financial inputs from donors (Dees, 1998; Dees & Anderson, 2003; 
Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Wry & York, 2017). Due to this unique feature, social 
ventures have been of interest to organizational scholars (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010). 
So far, most of the academic attention in the field of social entrepreneurship has given to 
the challenges social ventures face when internal or external groups disagree with the 
logic that the organization should prioritize (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Ebrahim et al., 
2014). Many research in social entrepreneurship has focused on how social ventures can 
effectively resolve the tensions arise from conflicting demands related to economic and 
social welfare logic (Wry & York, 2017). While these studies provide useful insights to 
understand already established social ventures, research in early-stage social ventures are 
still emerging.  
To extend our understanding about this understudied but promising topic, the 
current dissertation investigates resource acquisition and the first CEO selection, which 
are crucial events in the early-stage of social ventures that can have lasting impacts on the 
ventures’ survival in future. Additionally, I explore funding organizations which offer 
early-stage social ventures financial and strategic support. It contributes to advance the 
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understanding of the impact of funding organizations has on early-stage social ventures 
and the field of social entrepreneurship.  
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I explore early-stage social ventures’ acquisition 
of resources from venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs). VPFs are emerging 
as a major source of financing for social ventures in nascent stage. The fact of being 
selected as a fellow of prominent VPFs provide credibility to social entrepreneurs. As a 
result, it can highly improve social entrepreneurs’ chance to obtain additional financial 
resources and strategic supports from other VPFs. Subsequently, social ventures’ chance 
to survive and create continual social impact increases. However, we know little about 
which aspects of social ventures contribute to its success in fundraising from VPFs. 
Chapter 2 investigates the factors across core founder, founding team, and social venture 
level that amplify or attenuate the venture’s possibility of obtaining support from VPFs. 
The suggested model also describes how these factors are related to each other.  
Chapter 3 empirically investigates one of the critical milestones for social 
ventures, the first CEO selection. The role of the first CEO is crucial for early-stage 
social ventures’ survival rate and future performance, as the first CEO paves the 
fundamentals for the venture, which have lasting effects. There are established literature 
on leadership emergence in leaderless groups, but not much academic attention has given 
to the first CEO selection of early-stage social venture founding team. Further, social 
ventures provide a unique context to explore leadership emergence due to their dualistic 
nature, pursuing both social mission and financial profits. In Chapter 3, I examine the 
criteria founding teams use when they select one of them as the first CEO of the social 
venture. Specifically, I focus on how factors related to prior occupational exposures and 
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gender influence the CEO selection. The findings indicate that a founder’s social 
experience largely affects his or her CEO assignment. Additionally, the results show that 
commercial experience only enhances a female social entrepreneur’s likelihood of 
becoming the CEO. These findings demonstrate that early-stage social ventures tend to 
prioritize leader candidates’ social experience above other occupational experiences in 
the first CEO selection, and positive violation of gender stereotype helps female founders 
become the first CEO.  
In Chapter 4, I shift the focus to impact investors, explicitly funding foundations 
that primarily support organizations with social aim. This chapter is a qualitative case 
study about the Echoing Green Foundation, a New York City-based nonprofit public 
charity that selects promising social ventures and provides those with seed-capital and 
non-financial support annually. In this chapter, I investigate the Echoing Green’s survival 
strategy in response to the financial crisis in 2008, which increased the demand for 
funding foundation’s service while decreased financial inputs from donors. In particular, 
I examine how the Echoing Green improves its financial situation by collaborating with 
other private foundations and financial institutions. Also, I discuss how the Echoing 
Green’s new partnerships affect its board construction and the consequent changes in the 
field of social entrepreneurship.  
Overall, this dissertation discusses factors that contribute to early-stage social 
ventures’ acquisition of funding, how early-stage social ventures select their first CEO, 
and how impact investors, significant supporters for social entrepreneurship, overcome 
external threats and how their survival strategy leads to following changes in the field of 
social entrepreneurship. 
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CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING RESOURCES OF EARLY-STAGE SOCIAL 
VENTURES: A SIGNALING THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON VENTURE 
PHILANTHROPY-ORIENTED FOUNDATIONS’ FUNDING DECISION 
ABSTRACT 
 
Venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs) have an increasing impact on 
social entrepreneurship by supporting social ventures with creative ideas to solve social 
problems. However, we know little regarding which aspects of social ventures contribute 
to raising funds from VPFs and how these aspects are created during social ventures’ 
formation. To extend our understanding of this topic, this article provides a theoretical 
framework that explicates how social ventures’ key signals to prospective lenders, 
specifically VPFs, are created and work. Deriving insights from signaling theory, this 
article theorizes that direct influence of core founders’ breadth of functional knowledge, 
founding teams’ dominant function diversity, and social ventures’ entrepreneurial 
orientation and mission alignment on social ventures’ likelihood of obtaining seed capital 
from VPFs. Utilizing insights from the research on social imprinting, entrepreneurial 
team-building, and team diversity, the model also illustrates how a core founder’s breadth 
of knowledge and personal experience with a focal social problem affect his or her 
criteria on founding team member selection and eventually shape the level of 
entrepreneurial orientation and mission alignment of new social ventures.  
INTRODUCTION 
Venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs) are emerging as one of the 
primary sources of seed capital for early-stage social ventures that seek to provide 
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systematic solutions to social problems. To date, prominent VPFs demonstrate growing 
influence in social entrepreneurship by investing in innovative ideas for creating genuine 
and long-lasting change in a society. In addition to financial resources, VPFs provide 
strategic support, mentorship, and advice for promising new social ventures to move 
forward to the next stage. For instance, the Echoing Green foundation has offered grants 
and necessary supports for early-stage social ventures that address grave social issues 
encountered by billions of people, such as limited access to education, environmental 
pollution, food insecurity, and extreme poverty. Funding from Echoing Green consisted 
of a two-year stipend of $90,000 to two-person partnerships in 2018. Over the past three 
decades, Echoing Green has provided more than $40 million in seed capital to more than 
700 social ventures, as well as mentorship and strategic foundational support from the 
international business community to help social entrepreneurs achieve their business plan 
goals.  
VPFs select social ventures that have a vision, talent, and strategic plan to 
maximize social benefits. In contrast to traditional charities, the grant-making process of 
VPFs is strategic rather than need-based. VPFs seek accountable social entrepreneurs 
who can generate substantial and tangible social returns with a well-defined goal of 
creating impact. Thus, to obtain support from VPFs, early-stage social ventures should 
effectively signal their credibility and capability to achieve the intended social mission. 
Although social entrepreneurship is attracting growing amounts of talents, grants, and 
attention today, relatively less scholarly focus has been placed on the signals early-stage 
social ventures use to successfully raise funding from VPFs and how these signals are 
formed in the founding phase. To extend our understanding of this topic, the current 
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research investigates the following research questions: 1) What characteristics of nascent 
social ventures contribute to successful fundraising from VPFs? 2) How are these 
characteristics created during the social venture formation?  
 In prior research on financing of traditional ventures, signaling theory has been 
widely applied (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), and the literature showed that 
information available to investors plays a significant role in the investment decision 
(Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005). For instance, the knowledge and skills that founders have 
amassed through past experiences (Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009; Hsu, 2007) and the 
features of the founding team (Beckman & Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007; Eisenhardt & 
Schoohoven, 1990) and those of the venture (Moss, Newbaun, & Meyskens, 2015) work 
as crucial inputs that affect resource providers’ funding decisions. Along the same line, 
founder backgrounds and venture characteristics may work as important sources of 
signals for VPFs’ assessment of social ventures.  
The entrepreneurship literature has suggested that heterogeneity in talent and 
expertise within a founding team has a critical impact on the success of a new venture 
(Bamford, Dean, & McDougall, 2000). The task-related diversity of the founding team 
leads to constructive conflicts among team members with different perspectives, which 
enable them to yield innovative solutions (Der Foo, Wong, & Ong, 2005; Beckman et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the breadth of functional knowledge of a core founder and a 
founding team can signal social ventures’ capability to address entrepreneurial 
challenges. Thus, I propose that experienced task diversity at both core founder and 
founding team would positively affect the evaluation of social ventures by VPFs. 
Additionally, I posit that entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and mission alignment may 
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signal a social venture’s ability to accomplish a social mission in a creative and efficient 
manner.  
 In addition to signals directly affecting funding decisions of VPFs, the current 
research focuses on how a core founder’s breadth of knowledge and personal experience 
caused by a social problem shape the characteristics of the founding team and the 
venture. Based upon a resource dependence logic, I theorize that core founders with 
broad functional experiences would primarily consider candidates’ value congruency 
rather than human capital needs in their new founding team member selection. As core 
founders with broad sets of functional knowledge are able to fill in many different 
functions by themselves, they will be more interested in the value of candidates as social 
entrepreneurs and team players. On the other hand, core founders with fewer functional 
skills might mainly value the knowledge and the expertise of candidates. This tendency in 
founding team building becomes more salient when a core founder’s motivation for 
establishing a social venture is related to his or her personal experience with a focal 
social problem. Having a personal experience implies that a core founder knows why the 
social mission should be addressed and what needs to be done to support beneficiaries. 
This in-depth understanding of a focal social problem enhances a core founder’s 
confidence in mission success and thus affects his or her team member selection criteria.  
 This research offers several contributions. First, it extends our understanding of 
signaling theory to early-stage social ventures’ fundraising context. By highlighting 
important social venture characteristics that convey positive signals to VPFs, this study 
elucidates how to effectively reduce information asymmetry between early-stage social 
ventures and VPFs. Second, the theoretical framework suggested in this study can 
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improve our understanding of the spillover effect of core founder characteristics on the 
social venture attributes. Beginning with a core founder’s founding team formation, the 
proposed model describes how characteristics of a core founder, a founding team, and a 
social venture relate to each other. Third, this study contributes to social entrepreneurship 
literature by identifying core founders’ personal experiences related to a focal social 
problem as important resources that affect social venture characteristics.  
VENTURE PHILANTHROPY-ORIENTED FOUNDATIONS 
Becoming a fellow of a prominent VPF lends credence to a social entrepreneur’s 
capabilities and enhances their social capital (Sen, 2007). Consequently, receiving 
funding from VPFs significantly reduces the uncertainty regarding the social 
entrepreneur’s competency (Bugg-Levine, Kogut, & Kulatilaka, 2012) to other resource 
providers, thus allowing him or her to access additional funding sources. Diversifying 
sources of financing enhances the ventures’ likelihood of survival. For instance, 
Meyskens and her colleagues’ study of 70 Ashoka fellows demonstrate that, as a source 
of financing becomes more diversified, the number of partners and the probability of 
survival significantly increase (Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 
2010). Additionally, an evaluation study conducted by Ashoka in 2002 of fellows elected 
in 1997 revealed that five years after receiving funding from Ashoka, 94% were still 
enhancing and spreading their innovations; 93% had proved their project and, in turn, had 
been replicated by other independent organizations. An additional 56% had affected 
changes in national policies or legislation; and 72% were considered leaders in their areas 
(from Sen, 2007). Moreover, 70% of Echoing Green-funded organizations from 1990-
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2015 are still in operation in 2018. Overall, data shows that successful fundraising from 
VPFs enhances early-stage social ventures’ odds of survival.  
 Resource providers to early-stage ventures typically examine aspects of the 
venture, the founder, and the perception of the founder’s aptitude for execution (Huang & 
Pearce, 2015; Huang & Knight, 2017; Lee & Huang, 2018). It implies that resource 
providers consider the qualities not only of the venture and the founder but also of the fit 
between the two (Kaplan, Sensoy, & Stromberg, 2009; Lee & Huang, 2018). In the 
evaluation of early-stage social ventures, VPFs face a lack of objective data on ventures’ 
potential success, such as proven products and financial performance, because there is not 
much available public information about organizations in the early stage (Moss et al., 
2015). Furthermore, the quality of social mission is difficult to evaluate. There are no 
standardized criteria for evaluating the quality of a social mission because all social 
ventures are driven by virtuous motivation and empathy towards people in need. 
Therefore, VPFs must heavily rely upon signals based on the attributes of the core 
founder, the founding team, and the venture that are regarded as co-varying with the 
social ventures’ underlying quality.  
 For instance, the Echoing Green foundation’s application criteria includes 
purpose/passion, resilience, leadership, and ability to attract resources (Fellowship 
Program Application Selection Criteria, Echoing Green, 2018). All of these criteria are 
related to knowledge and previous experiences of a core founder and a founding team. 
Purpose/passion indicates how deeply an applicant cares and understands about the social 
phenomenon, which is related to the applicant’s personal experience. Leadership 
indicates unique skills, experiences, and achievements of an applicant. Ability to attract 
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resources is also related to an applicant’s attributes, including social network, 
occupational prestige, and educational affiliation.  
SIGNALS ACROSS THREE LEVELS: CORE FOUNDER, FOUNDING TEAM, 
AND VENTURE 
Information Asymmetry and Signaling Theory   
 Signaling theory is primarily concerned with information asymmetry between two 
parties (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 2002). As certain information is private, 
information asymmetry emerges between those who hold private information and those 
who could potentially make better decisions if they had that information (Connelly et al., 
2011). Two types of private information are particularly crucial when information 
asymmetry exists: (1) information about characteristics such as quality and reliability, 
and (2) information about the intention of behaviors (Stiglitz, 2000). Signals can be used 
to help parties resolve information asymmetry related to this unobservable private 
information (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003; Moss et al., 2015). 
Not all conveyances from social entrepreneurs are deemed valid signals by 
potential investors. Typically, to be productive, signals must be observable and costly 
(Moss et al., 2015). Observability indicates the extent to which outsiders can notice the 
signals. Costly refers to the sender’s expense associated with signaling desirable 
characteristics, such as quality, reliability, and passion. Educational degrees, industry 
certifications, or professional credentials are examples of observable and costly signals.  
Building on this, this research argues that the social venture’s likelihood of 
obtaining funding from VPFs is significantly affected by human capital endowments in 
founders, which are observable and costly to obtain. Specifically, I focus on the human 
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capital of a core founder, an individual who had the initial idea and originated the 
founding activities (Wasserman, 2012; 2016), and of a founding team. VPFs are likely to 
focus on the background of a core founder in their venture selection process, because a 
core founder’s characteristics have a significant influence on a social venture’ survival 
rate and performance in future. By attracting co-founders, employees, and investors to 
enhance organizational capabilities (Wasserman, 2016), core founders initially create 
fundamental elements for social ventures and pave the path for the ventures’ future 
success. In the following section, the signaling role of a core founder’s breadth of 
functional knowledge and a founding team’s dominant function diversity in the VPFs’ 
evaluation will be discussed.  
Core Founders’ Breadth of Knowledge, Founding Teams’ Functional Diversity, and 
Funding from Venture Philanthropy-oriented Foundations 
The core founder’s breadth of functional knowledge. The breadth of functional 
knowledge of the entrepreneur indicates the extent to which the entrepreneur possesses 
knowledge of a variety of different business areas necessary for starting and operating a 
new organization (Denker et al., 2009). It is derived from diverse functional experiences 
in previous organizations (Taylor & Greve, 2006). The jack-of-all-trades view of 
entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2004) posits that experiences in a large number of different 
roles increase the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur (Lazear, 2004; Wagner, 2006). 
This implies that entrepreneurs need to have knowledge in a variety of areas to integrate 
many ingredients needed for survival and success of business (Wagner, 2006). This 
integration allows entrepreneurs to take multiple perspectives for deepening the 
understanding of the business environment.  
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The importance of founders’ prior experience for identifying problems and 
creating solutions have been highlighted prominently in the extant entrepreneurship 
literature. Founders’ identification of strategic choices regarding new markets and 
innovative solutions is significantly bounded by their limited prior knowledge (Fern, 
Cardinal, & O'Neill, 2012; Gruber, 2010; Shane, 1995; Shane & Venkatraman, 2000). 
Consequently, the search for alternative solutions is less challenging to founders with a 
broader set of knowledge and experience endowments than people with more constrained 
endowments, as the former’s local search space may be wider and thus more likely to 
identify diverse alternatives than the latter with a bounded search space (Gruber, 2010). 
Likewise, founders with a broader set of knowledge and experience are better able to 
recombine different knowledge components to achieve novel solutions (Gruber, 2010; 
Taylor & Greve, 2006). Therefore, business ideas from founders with task-related 
diversity tend to be positively evaluated by external funders (Der Foo et al., 2005). 
Building on this, I argue that a core founder who can utilize an extensive set of 
knowledge and experience endowments may be in a better position to attract funding 
from prospective investors due to their superior possibilities of arriving at innovative 
solutions. 
Proposition 1: The core founder's breadth of functional knowledge is 
positively related to the social venture’s likelihood of obtaining funding 
from venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs). 
 
Founding teams’ dominant function diversity. In addition to core founders’ 
breath of functional knowledge, founding teams’ diverse knowledge and skills would also 
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signal the venture’s innovativeness to VPFs. This study focuses on dominant function 
diversity, which is mainly concerned with a team’s breadth of experience across 
functional categories (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). The founding team’s dominant 
function diversity refers to a form of diversity in the different functional areas within 
which team members have spent the greater part of their careers (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 
2002). This concept is based on the assumption that each member provides a specific 
functional perspective to a team, a perspective obtained from experience that is related to 
a particular function (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Dominant function diversity is high 
when team members have specialized functional experiences that complement one 
another in a manner that includes a wide range of functional areas within a team. 
Comprehensive experiences and perspectives can yield more alternatives to solve 
complicated problems and lead to a thorough evaluation of alternatives, thus ultimately 
improving the overall qualities and effectiveness of decisions made by team members 
(Beckman et al., 2007; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008). Therefore, dominant function 
diversity engenders positive outcomes for organizations in general (e.g., Cummings, 
2004; Wegge, Roth, Neubach, Schmidt, & Kanfer, 2008).  
There is a large stream of entrepreneurship literature relating founding team 
diversity and its innovativeness (Beckman et al., 2007; Beckman & Burton, 2008; 
Chowdhury, 2005; Eesley, Hsu, & Roberts, 2014; Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007). For 
instance, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) found that the greater the team 
heterogeneity is, the higher the growth rate of the new technology firm, because the 
heterogeneity in industry experience among the members tends to create constructive 
conflict, which yields innovative outcomes (Eisenhardt & Schoohoven, 1990). Similarly, 
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Beckman, Burton, and O’Reilly (2007) showed that having founding top-management 
team members with diverse prior experiences yields positive outcomes. Specifically, 
teams with diverse prior company affiliations and broad prior functional experiences are 
more likely to achieve critical entrepreneurial firm milestones such as venture capital 
financing and successful completion of an initial public offering (IPO) than their 
counterparts with less functional diversity and experiences. As founding teams with a 
variety of skills and experiences tend to yield more innovative performances by 
integrating diverse perspectives, their ventures are likely to obtain much attention from 
investors (Beckman et al., 2007).  
VPFs importantly consider the innovativeness of social ventures in their venture 
selection process (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). As social ventures are established to 
address social problems that are not solved by governmental help and an extant firm’s 
approach, their solutions need to be creative to result in meaningful social changes. 
Furthermore, early-stage social ventures need to deal with a series of unexpected 
situations. A wide range of expertise and knowledge within founding teams can improve 
the quality of ventures’ decisions in complex situations. Therefore, a founding team’s 
dominant function diversity conveys a positive signal to VPFs. 
 
 Proposition 2: The founding team's dominant function diversity is 
positively related to the social venture’s likelihood of obtaining funding 
from venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs).  
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In addition to human capital attributes of a core founder and a founding team, 
characteristics of a venture deliver important signals to prospective resource providers. In 
the following section, I suggest that social ventures’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and 
mission alignment enhance the possibility of obtaining funding from VPFs. 
Social Ventures’ Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) and Mission Alignment on 
Funding from Venture Philanthropy-oriented Foundations 
Entrepreneurial orientation. Social entrepreneurship has been broadly 
conceptualized as reflecting two key elements: an overarching social mission and 
entrepreneurial creativity (Nicholls, 2006; Peredo & McLean, 2006). Dees (1998) 
declared, “social entrepreneurs are one species in the genus entrepreneur” (p. 3). Based 
on Drucker (1985) and Stevenson, Roberts, and Grousbeck (1989), Dees (1998) 
identified the entrepreneurial aspects of social entrepreneurship as recognizing 
opportunities, continuously engaging in innovation and modification, and displaying 
resourcefulness, which means the refusal to be constrained by prevailing resource 
limitations. Highlighting the entrepreneurial element in social entrepreneurship, 
Pomerantz (2003) describes key aspects of a social venture involve taking a business-
like, innovative approach to the mission of delivering community services (Peredo & 
McLean, 2006). Overall, scholars emphasized that innovation is an essential component 
of social entrepreneurship (Short et al., 2009).  
Since social entrepreneurship emerges because of an unfulfilled need by 
traditional organizations, the replication of existing practices and processes is inadequate 
for social ventures to address social issues (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006). 
Accordingly, EO, which represents a mindset and framework regarding entrepreneurship 
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that is reflected in a firm’s ongoing strategy-making processes, structures, and behaviors, 
may signal that the social venture is sufficiently capable to resolve a focal social problem 
in an innovative manner (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000). Miller (1983) posited 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking as constituents of EO and these were 
combined to form a higher-order indicator at the firm-level. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
conceived two additional constituents—competitive aggressiveness and autonomy—to 
the original three domains of EO (Rauch, Wiklund, & Frese, 2017; Saha, Kumar, Dutta, 
& Dutta, 2017).   
Research in entrepreneurship has noted that the EO of a venture is a crucial 
determinant of the venture’s positive outcomes related to both financial and non-financial 
performance (Wilkund & Shepherd, 2005; Zahra, Nielsen, & Bogner, 1999). EO also 
plays a significant role in the non-profit organizations’ growth and sustainability and 
facilitates the market orientation of the non-profit (Morris et al., 2007). The role of EO is 
particularly salient when the ventures are under conditions of environmental turbulence 
(Morris et al., 2007). Therefore, the role of EO would be salient in the context of early-
stage social ventures as well.  
VPFs have stated that social ventures’ entrepreneurial skills and creativity are 
important selection criteria. The previous research provides evidences that social venture 
capitalists tend to relate a social venture’s innovative capabilities to its probability of 
being effective (Miller, Wesley, & Curtis, 2010). An empirical study lends weight to this 
finding by showing that impact investors primarily attribute eco-ventures’ failure in 
fundraising to the lack of innovativeness (Randjelovic, O’Rourke, & Orsato, 2003). 
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Considering these points, I suggest that the EO of social ventures will enhance the 
likelihood of winning funding from foundations over their counterparts with lower EO. 
 
Proposition 3: The social venture's EO (entrepreneurial orientation) is 
positively related to the social venture’s likelihood of obtaining funding 
from venture philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs). 
 
Mission alignment. The social mission is the raison d'être of social ventures. An 
organizational mission embodies the most fundamental signal of an organization’s 
identity and its ultimate goal (Bart, Bontis, & Taggar, 2001; Perrini & Vurro, 2006). Dees 
(1998) posits that the dedication to the mission of creating and sustaining social impact is 
what distinguishes organizations in social entrepreneurship from those in the commercial 
and traditional entrepreneurship sector. In its fellow selection process, Echoing Green 
foundation crucially considers the importance of social issue that an applicant addresses, 
an applicant’s potential for creating big, bold impact, and an effectiveness of business 
model.  To signal its effectiveness to VPFs, social entrepreneurs need to be clear and 
concise in how their social venture will run. In other words, all organizational elements of 
social ventures need to be aligned to support its social mission to successfully raise seed 
capital from VPFs.  
Organizational alignment refers to the degree to which an organization’s design, 
strategy, and culture are cooperating to achieve the same desired goals (Semler, 1997). 
High alignment requires agreement rather than conflict among the strategic, structural, 
and cultural variables. Nearly by definition, an organization that is well aligned is 
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efficient. Tichy (1983) posited that the strategic management task is to maintain an 
organization that is both internally and externally aligned. Miles and Snow (1984) 
extended this reasoning by suggesting that an organization that has a tight fit or alignment 
with various contingency factors (e.g., size, environment, technology, resource 
availability) can significantly improve firm performance (Crotts, Dickson, & Ford, 2005). 
The researchers also stated, “Tight fit is the underlying causal dynamic producing 
sustained, excellent performance and strong corporate culture” (Miles & Snow, 1984). 
As a type of internal organizational alignment, mission alignment indicates a 
consistent fit between the organizational mission and the structure, policies, and 
procedures of the organization and the practices of its leadership (Crotts et al., 2005). A 
strong mission alignment offers the organization the ability to focus its resources on the 
desired outputs with the greatest efficiency. A strong congruency between social mission 
and other organizational elements, such as organizational structures, practices, and 
procedures, implies social ventures’ effectiveness in the strategic positioning and the 
decision-making pattern for creating meaningful social impacts. As VPFs want to select 
early-stage social ventures that lead to appropriate and noticeable social changes, social 
ventures with a strong mission alignment may convey a favorable signal to VPFs.  
 
Proposition 4: The venture’s mission alignment is positively related to the 
social venture’s likelihood of obtaining funding from venture 
philanthropy-oriented foundations (VPFs). 
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THE FORMATION OF SOURCES OF SIGNALS ACROSS THREE LEVELS 
The Importance of Core Founders’ Initial Decisions   
The creation of a new organization entails myriad decisions. Initial decisions are 
the charge of a core founder, who has the idea to launch the startup and is driving the 
initial stage of establishing it. In many cases, core founders initiate entrepreneurial 
activities entirely on their own, although later in the process they may turn to others for 
help. Others begin with a team, forming an organization with collective efforts. Once a 
core founder decides to make a founding team, he or she invites co-founders. These 
initial strategic choices of a core founder are crucial for the venture’s future because these 
choices have lasting consequences for the venture’s survival and performance (Ruef, 
Aldrich, & Carter, 2003).  
The founding period remains the key sensitive period for organizations, as it 
marks the fundamental transition from nonexistence to existence (Marquis & Tilcsik, 
2013). The social imprinting literature noted that the elements an organization takes from 
its founding environment will persist well beyond the founding phase (Johnson, 2007; 
Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Founders leave legacies in ventures by making crucial 
decisions early on in the venture’s development (Mathias, Williams, & Smith, 2015). 
Baron and his colleagues (1999) found that a founder’s initial decisions concerning 
human resources during the early stage of the firm constrain the pool of people who may 
be willing or able to join the company, thus have an enduring effect on the firm’s 
employment pattern (Barron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999). Similarly, Johnson (2007) 
emphasized the important role of entrepreneurs “who stamp new organizations with the 
distinctive signs of their founding times” (Johnson, 2007, p. 122). Namely, organizations 
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select and incorporate elements of the historically specific environment through its 
founders (Johnson, 2007; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). Overall, the research highlights the 
major role of founders in choosing and integrating contextual factors into ventures, which 
become lasting parts of ventures. 
The prior work on new ventures has shown that a founders’ prior work 
experiences shape a firm’s initial strategy in founding team formation (Denker et al., 
2009; Fern, Cardinal, & O'Neill, 2012; Kim & Longest, 2014). For instance, Fern, 
Cardinal, and O'Neill (2012) found that a founder's experience strongly constrains 
choices of new companies. Similarly, Kim and Longest (2014) demonstrated various 
aspects of occupational experiences of a founder that affect the number of people 
founders choose to involve in founding efforts. While founders with highly interactive 
occupational backgrounds are more likely to opt for more collaboration, founders 
possessing venture-specific industry experience are more likely to recruit a small number 
of collaborators or start solo. Additionally, an entrepreneur possessing a greater breadth 
of knowledge tends to create fewer jobs, and entrepreneurs possessing prior leadership 
experience tend to create more jobs (Denker et al., 2009). Generally, the previous 
literature acknowledges that the founder's human capital characteristics, including pre-
entry knowledge endowments and breadth of knowledge, are key to determine the 
venture's early strategy for adding new members. 
Core Founders’ Breath of Functional Knowledge and Founding Team Formation 
Some scholars view the addition of a new member as driven by economic, 
instrumental considerations, while other scholars view the process as motivated primarily 
by interpersonal attraction and by social networks (Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, & 
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Sapienza, 2006). According to the first view, new members are selected based on the 
firm’s needs to fill particular "gaps" in capabilities. Several early conceptual studies 
elaborate this competency-driven search perspective of team formation (Francis & 
Sandberg, 2000; Larson & Starr, 1993). A resource-dependence view is implicit in the 
competency-driven search model; the process is intentionally rational and focuses on 
identifying the candidate with the best access to resources critical to moving the firm 
forward (Forbes et al., 2006). Reflecting the resource dependence view, a study by 
Ucbasaran and his colleagues (2003) showed that the size of the founding team is 
negatively related to the addition of new members to the founding team. This finding 
indicates that seeking new members is often driven by a deficiency in the necessary 
functions (Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, & Westhead, 2003).   
The second view for founding team expansion is based on the literature of the 
social psychological needs of existing team members. Ruef and his colleagues (2003) 
found that the entrepreneurial team composition was strongly influenced by relational 
trust and the homophily of personal characteristics. In the sociology literature, homophily 
refers to the selection of other team members by similar characteristics, such as gender, 
ethnicity, nationality, appearance, and more (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; 
Ruef et al., 2003). Sociologists have shown in small businesses that people of the same 
gender or race and people of similar geographic origins, educational backgrounds, and 
functional experiences are disproportionately likely to establish companies together 
(Wasserman, 2012). 
 In the founding team context, homogeneity has substantial benefits, likely the 
most immediate of which is speed. For a founder who was scrambling to meet the 
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challenges of a growing startup, choosing co-founders between people who he or she 
currently knows may be the quickest and easiest solution. This process also generally 
takes less time to develop effective working relationships with people who are similar to 
the core founder. When founders share a similar background, they share a common 
language, culture, and narratives that facilitate communication. For instance, Francis and 
Sandberg (2000) found that friendship allows the venture to incorporate people who 
would otherwise price their services beyond the reach of a startup venture if friendship 
were not involved (Forbes et al., 2006; Francis & Sandberg, 2000). Thus, when a core 
founder can use social networks to add new members, the search may be affected by 
similarities between a core founder and a prospective member, previous relationships, 
and shared networks, instead of a prospective member’s functional expertise.  
As all entrepreneurial decisions involve complexity, responsibility, and 
challenges, founders with the breadth of functional knowledge should be able to address 
these difficulties more proficiently than founders with the less diverse knowledge set 
(Burke, Fitzroy, & Nolan, 2000). In addition, due to the broad skill sets and diverse 
industry knowledge, founders with broad functional knowledge are liable to believe that 
their capabilities are currently sufficient to realize business ideas. Having such 
confidence lowers the perceived needs for immediate assistance and reduces the 
motivation for seeking collaborators with complementary knowledge (Kim & Longest, 
2014; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, & Kim, 2014). Thus, these entrepreneurs are less likely to 
recruit strangers in need of functional assistance early on (Kim & Longest, 2014). 
Therefore, I propose that, when a core founder has experience in diverse functional areas, 
the level of the founding team's dominant function diversity may decrease. 
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Proposition 5: The core founder’s breadth of functional knowledge is 
negatively related to the founding team’s dominant function diversity. 
 
The team building process of homophily suggests that, when free choice is 
possible, individuals will interact with others in a like-minded manner (Burt & Reagans, 
1997; Forbes et al., 2006). According to homophily logics, when a core founder 
possesses substantial knowledge sets necessary for moving the social venture forward 
and has a network that enables him or her to access a large pool of human resources, the 
core founder is likely to add new members based on interpersonal attraction or similarity 
in mindsets instead of complementary resources.  
Previous research suggests that social networks provide inexpensive and trustful 
sources of information about necessary resources for entrepreneurs (Forbes et al., 2006), 
and they are the most common sources for seeking business partners (Ensley, Carland, 
Carland, & Banks, 1999). Core founders with broad functional knowledge are likely to 
have a larger social network than their counterparts who have been working at one 
functional position. This opens the possibility for these core founders to invite people 
from previous employment to new founding teams because it significantly reduces the 
uncertainty of new member invitation.  
New founding team members who joined from a core founder’s social network 
may possess a similar mindset and identity with a core founder because new members 
decide to endure a high degree of uncertainty by joining the social venture and working 
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with the core founder. Joining a new social venture is a financially risky decision, as its 
founding is primarily driven by a strong orientation towards a social change and empathy 
towards people in need instead of by economic self-interest. Furthermore, the structure of 
a social venture is more unstable than traditional organizations in general. Unless new 
members agree with the social mission of the venture, they may not take such a high risk 
at the expense of their current job.  
Overall, founders with a breadth of occupational knowledge for launching a social 
venture are more likely to invite founding team members on a familiarity and attraction 
base instead of a functionality base. Thus, expectedly, the founding team constructed by a 
core founder with a breadth of functional knowledge will incorporate people who possess 
a similar mindset, agree on a social venture’s mission and vision and have a strong bond 
with a core founder. This founding team will have a high level of shared team identity. 
Accordingly, new founding team members selected throughout network searching may 
possess similar values to the core founder. 
 
Proposition 6: The core founder’s breadth of functional knowledge is 
positively related to the founding team’s shared team identity. 
 
The Moderating Role of Core Founders’ Direct Personal Experience with a Focal 
Social Problem  
Each social entrepreneur has a different motivation of starting a social venture. 
The motivation of some social entrepreneur is based on triggering events that afford 
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reasons to help others or to address social problems. Due to the variance in sources of 
motivation to establish a social venture, each social entrepreneur possess a different level 
of understanding of the focal social problem, the beneficiary groups, and of the 
institutional structure of the context that their organization operates in. At the one 
extreme, there are entrepreneurs who had directly suffered from the focal social problem 
at one point in life. For example, the founding motivation of Matt Dickson, a social 
entrepreneur who strives to empower young women in Kenya to launch their egg farming 
businesses, lies in his childhood experience (Echoing Green, 2016). Born and raised in 
Kenya, he acknowledges the realities of poverty. His understanding and experiences of 
poverty inspire him to create a social venture that can provide better and healthier life for 
his family and community. Conversely, the other extreme may be social entrepreneurs 
who have limited exposed to the focal social problem, such as people who recognize the 
opportunity for social business by a coincidence. A variety of different cases can exist in 
between.  
Previous research suggests that social entrepreneurship is more problem-solving 
focused than traditional ventures, thus how a social entrepreneur is related to the focal 
social problem can largely explain the social ventures’ entrepreneurial process and 
performance (Yitshaki & Kropp, 2016). For instance, if a social entrepreneur had gone 
through the focal social problem in past, he or she is likely to have a concrete 
understanding about the phenomenon and detailed contextual information surrounding 
the issue. This personal experience with the social problem provides the social 
entrepreneur with specific and unique knowledge set about the problem that the social 
ventures addresses which might ease the venture’s effective operation. Thus, an 
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entrepreneur’s personal experience with the social problem is a valuable resource. It is 
also rare and non-imitable, as it is primarily accrued from an entrepreneur’s life events. 
 The accrued knowledge from an experience with a social problem is 
fundamentally different from the knowledge obtained from social functional occupational 
experiences. Unlike functional knowledge, direct personal experience with the social 
problem is not easily tradable or applicable outside of the social venture. Therefore, it 
could only serve as a source of sustainable competitive advance in the social 
entrepreneurship context. In summary, under the circumstances of social 
entrepreneurship, as a valuable, rare, and non-imitable resource, direct personal 
experience with the social problem provides social entrepreneurs with a much clear 
understanding of why the focal social issue should be solved, what is necessary for 
mitigating it, and what needs to be done for effective implementation of strategy.  
When social entrepreneurs with the breadth of knowledge also have personal 
experiences that drive them to solve the focal social problem, they may believe that they 
have sufficient capabilities to build and operate new ventures. Being confident lowers the 
perceived need for immediate assistance and reduces the motivation of seeking 
collaborators (Kim & Longest, 2014; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, & Kim, 2014). Thus, 
personal experience may enhance the tendency of founders with the breadth of 
knowledge to avoid the pursuit of a functionally diverse founding team. Therefore, I 
suggest that the manner in which a core founder experiences a focal social problem may 
attenuate the influence of the core founder’s breadth of knowledge on the pattern of 
composing a founding team.  
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Conversely, although a core founder has a wide range of functional experiences, 
without direct personal experience with a focal social problem, the core founder may be 
inclined to compose a more “complete” founding team. To complement the deficiency in 
in-depth understanding about the focal social problem, these core founders are likely to 
invite individuals who are experts in various areas. This practice will strengthen the 
dominant function diversity of a new social venture. Given the arguments thus far, I 
suggest that the founder's manner of experiencing social problems and their range of 
functional knowledge will jointly determine the dominant function diversity level of a 
founding team. 
 
Proposition 7a: The core founder’s personal direct experience with the 
social problem positively moderates the negative link between the core 
founder’s breadth of functional knowledge and the founding team’s 
dominant functional diversity. 
 
Having worked in various areas provides greater confidence to social 
entrepreneurs in addressing challenges relevant to the founding of a social venture as well 
as its operation. Additionally, this experience provides social entrepreneurs rich social 
networks in addition to diverse knowledge and skills. Thus, social entrepreneurs with 
diverse pre-entry occupational experiences tend to convince others that they are 
sufficiently capable to attain the necessary resources in time from outside of the firm’s 
boundary. This tendency will be further augmented by social entrepreneurs’ belief that 
they have a thorough understanding of the context that the social venture will operate in 
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for managing unexpected challenges. In this circumstance, the search for founding team 
members is likely to be more relational instead of functional. Furthermore, core founders 
who lack contextual knowledge and direct experience with the social problem are more 
willing to seek assistance from other collaborators who can provide useful resources for 
the social venture. Thus, I expect that core founders without direct experience with the 
focal social problem are more likely to expand the search for founding team members 
with the necessary expertise beyond their own social network. As a result, the shared 
team identity of the founding team may decrease.  
 
Proposition 7b: The core founder’s personal direct experience with the 
social problem positively moderates the positive link between the core 
founder’s breadth of functional knowledge and the founding team’s shared 
team identity. 
 
The Influence of Founding Teams’ Dominant Function Diversity on Social 
Ventures’ Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) and Mission Alignment 
Founding teams’ dominant function diversity and social ventures’ EO and 
mission alignment. For young startups, having top management team members who 
have diverse prior experiences and myriad prior company affiliations yield positive 
venture outcomes (Bamford et al., 2000; Beckman et al., 2007). Moreover, the task-
related diversity of founding team members enhances team effectiveness and thus 
positively affects the external evaluations of the team’s business idea (Der Foo et al., 
2005). Beckman (2006) noted that founding teams whose members have worked at 
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diverse organizations are likely to engage in explorative behaviors because they have 
access to various information, ideas, and alternatives. Overall, the extant diversity 
literature suggests that different backgrounds and expertise within the founding team 
enhances the venture’s level of creativity (Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993).  
Creativity requires the capacity to think divergently, view things from various 
perspectives, and combine separate processes and products in novel modes (Amabile, 
1996; Shin, Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012). The value of diversity resides in the increased 
range of knowledge, skills, and perspectives available within a team (Williams & 
O'Reilly, 1998), which can be sources of creativity and innovation (Shin et al., 2012). 
Related to the extant literature, I propose that the dominant function diversity of founding 
team members may heighten their social ventures’ level of entrepreneurial orientation, 
which represents the entrepreneurial mindsets and behavioral patterns of the venture. 
 
Proposition 8: The founding team’s dominant function diversity is 
positively related to the social venture’s EO (entrepreneurial orientation). 
 
Conversely, the prior literature reveals that team functional diversity does not 
always have positive effects on venture performance (Bettenhausen, 1991; Kanter, 1988; 
Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001). Excessive diversity can make it difficult for team 
members to flesh out a given perspective in any depth, perhaps because issues compete 
for attention when team members are diverse (Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005). The 
new product team research found that the greater conflict in heterogeneous rather than 
homogeneous groups is often due to the difficulty that people have in understanding each 
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other when the members have different languages and vocabularies because of their 
professional socialization experiences and different goals (Dougherty, 1992). Empirical 
evidence suggests that the more functionally diverse a team is, the more extensive their 
task disagreements are (Lovelace et al. 2001). Given these points, I suggest that a 
founding team's dominant function diversity may exacerbate the social venture's mission 
alignment, which reflects the founding team members’ level of agreement on the mission 
and the strategic direction of social ventures. 
 
Proposition 9: The founding team’s dominant function diversity is 
negatively related to the social venture’s mission alignment. 
 
Founding teams’ shared team identity and social ventures’ EO and mission 
alignment. A shared identity among founding team members is one of the key 
entrepreneurial resources for new ventures with limited financial and human capital 
(Beckman, 2006; Hinds & Mortensen, 2005). A strong shared identity can reduce the 
level of interpersonal conflicts (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). Social categorization 
theory suggests that individuals reduce ambiguity and promote self-enhancement by 
partitioning their colleagues by relative similarity to themselves. Individuals create "in-
groups" composed of similar others and "out-groups" of those who are perceived as being 
different (Tajfel, 1974; 1981). The intergroup hostility can surface as conflict over 
workgroup members’ personal preferences or disagreements about interpersonal 
interactions, typically about non-work issues such as gossip, social events, or religious 
preferences. Therefore, team members with a strong shared identity are less likely to 
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experience relationship conflicts that lead to massive inefficiency in strategic decision 
making and implementations. 
The founding environment of an early-stage social venture is highly uncertain. 
Under such context, founding team’s shared identity can be a valuable asset, as it allows 
founding team members to communicate more efficiently than their counterparts who do 
not have strong shared team identity (Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims Jr, O’Bannon, & Scully, 
1994). Extant literature provides empirical evidence that founding teams with familiar 
members perform better because of improved coordination, high team cohesion, and 
enhanced intra-team trust (Kor, 2003; Zheng, 2012). Additionally, intra-team trust 
improves coordination among team members since its development of social or working 
interactions reduces emotional conflicts among team members (Edmondson, 1999; 
McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Zheng, 2012). Therefore, when the founding team 
has a strong shared identity, the new social venture is likely to exhibit strong mission 
alignment, because all founding team members may easily achieve an agreement on new 
ventures’ direction and other strategic decisions relevant to mission achievement. 
 
Proposition 10: The founding team’s shared team identity is positively 
related to the social venture’s mission alignment. 
 
Founding teams with common prior affiliations tend to engage more in 
exploitative strategies, because they have shared understandings and can thus act quickly. 
However, founding teams composed of members who have worked at many different 
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companies tend to engage more in explorative strategies because they have access to 
diverse information, unique ideas, and alternatives (Beckman, 2006). Heterogeneity in 
team resource endowments facilitates innovation-related performance of ventures and 
thus has a critical impact on the success of the new venture (Bamford et al., 2000). 
Collectively, extant studies posit that team composition shapes the range of new 
ventures’ outcomes relevant to innovation.     
"Groupthink" encourages individuals working closely together to think in the 
same way about issues (Shane, 1995). Groupthink often leads to concurrence-seeking 
tendencies and a failure to realistically evaluate different alternatives (Nijstad & De Dreu, 
2002). To smooth over conflicts and maintain high cohesion, team members with a high 
level of cohesion are likely to reject opposite views and only accept convergent opinions. 
The convergent thinking style and a confirmatory manner to appraise information are 
unlikely to cause creative solutions and high levels of innovation. Thus, the tendency of 
conformity prevalent in a team can restrict group innovativeness and cause only 
mediocre-level innovation (Chen, Liu, & Tjosvold, 2005). 
Shared team identity generates intra-team trust and team integration; however, 
excessive group cohesion often sacrifices each person’s unique idea to settle for mundane 
solutions that are agreeable to all team members (Barton Rabe, 2006). Therefore, I 
suggest that, when the founding team has a strong shared identity, they are likely to 
demonstrate a lower level of entrepreneurial orientation than their counterparts with a 
weaker shared identity who often experience constructive conflicts and disagreement on 
each other’s perspective. 
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Proposition 11: The founding team’s shared team identity is negatively 
related to the social venture’s entrepreneurial orientation (EO). 
 
Model 1: A Theoretical Model of Early-stage Social Venturs' Fundraising from 
VPFs 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 VPFs are increasingly recognized as important supporters for early-stage social 
ventures. However, our understanding of signals that social ventures can use to attain 
funding from VPFs and the sources of such signals has been limited. Due to the limited 
availability of objective data on proven products or financial records, VPFs are more 
likely to rely on relatively subjective but observable and costly signals related to social 
ventures’ capabilities to achieve their goals. Based upon insights from the signaling 
theory, I investigated sources of such signals including the breadth of functional 
knowledge of core founder, the functional diversity of the founding team, and the 
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entrepreneurial orientation and mission alignment of the venture, which may extensively 
affect funding decisions of VPFs.  
 Additionally, the current research provides a theoretical framework describing the 
process and development of the sources of signals across three domains: core founders, 
founding teams, and social ventures. By explicitly utilizing the process of the spillover 
effect of a core founders’ characteristics on his or her team and venture, the suggested 
theoretical framework contributes beyond the other signaling theory literature that 
focuses on direct signaling of ventures. Although these theories provide comprehensive 
explanations on effective signals, they do not offer any explanations on how these signals 
are shaped and evolved, which is the focal point of the theory of this research.  
Theoretical implications 
  This research makes several theoretical contributions to the extant literature. By 
applying signaling theory to demonstrate the fundraising process of early-stage social 
ventures, this research expands the range of where the signaling process occurs. By 
focusing on the unique context of social ventures seeking funding from VPFs, the 
theoretical model provides a holistic picture of which signals are crucial for the early-
stage social ventures’ fundraising success from VPFs and how they are created. In most 
theoretical arguments on venture financing, the discussion is often limited to ventures’ 
features laid in a single level. The suggested model describes how variables across three 
levels, core founder, founding the team, and entity, concurrently contribute to the 
increasing possibility of funding from foundations.  
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Moreover, this study adds value to the entrepreneurship literature by highlighting 
the importance of having members with a variety of expertise and skills to successfully 
obtain seed capital from VPFs. Similar to prior studies investigating micro-financing 
lenders’ decision making (Moss et al., 2015), I argued that certain factors imply 
innovativeness and effectiveness of social ventures; for example, the breadth of 
knowledge of a core founder, the dominant function diversity of a founding team, the EO, 
and the mission alignment are much more favorably considered than the social mission in 
VPFs’ assessments of early-stage social ventures. VPFs intend to generate social impact 
from their investment, which is fundamentally different from venture capitalists (VCs) 
for traditional ventures whose goal is to maximize financial returns. Despite this major 
difference, both VPFs and VCs do not want their investment to fail; thus, they may focus 
on the early-stage organizations most likely to survive and thrive. The theory emphasizes 
that, for ventures with a social mission, entrepreneurial qualities are essential to obtain 
support from resource providers.   
 This research also elucidates the spillover effect of a core founder characteristics 
on team and venture formation, which ultimately affect the investment decisions of VPFs. 
The prior literature on early-stage social ventures explains what makes social ventures 
succeed; however, it does not explicate how social ventures create such factors during its 
venture formation process. This paper addresses this gap by identifying that a core 
founder’s breadth of knowledge and personal experiences relevant to social venture 
founding motivation are particularly crucial for shaping other factors in social ventures. 
Utilizing insights from the research on social imprinting, entrepreneurial team-building, 
and team diversity, the theory explicates how a core founder’s breadth of knowledge and 
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personal experience with a focal social problem affect his or her criteria on founding 
team member selection and eventually shape the level of EO and mission alignment of 
new social ventures.  
 Additionally, this research adds value to the social entrepreneurship literature by 
recognizing that a core founder’s personal experience with a focal social problem affects 
the founding team and venture formation process. This research is the first that considers 
the triggering events of establishing social ventures as resources that can potentially 
contribute to the team-building process. The prior scholarly focus has been mainly on 
exploring social entrepreneurs’ various motivations to initiate founding activities to 
address social problems (Germak & Robinson, 2014; Yitshaki & Kropp, 2016). 
Extending previous research on entrepreneurs’ motivation, I examine how variances in 
founding motivations of social entrepreneurs would affect the team-building process. I 
believe the current research offers opportunities for future research on social 
entrepreneurs’ motivation to start social ventures. Future research can address how the 
narrative of the social entrepreneur’s founding story affects the resource provider’s 
assessment of the social venture. Additionally, scholars can explore differences in 
personal experiences with social problems related to social ventures’ survival rate and 
future performance. 
Practical implications 
 This research has several implications for social entrepreneurs considering VPFs 
as potential option for fundraising. This paper clarifies positive signals that are effective 
in attracting finances from VPFs. For social entrepreneurs, a greater awareness of their 
own characteristics can be critical in obtaining funding from VPFs. Additionally, this 
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research emphasizes that entrepreneurial orientation and mission alignment are sources of 
positive signal of the new ventures’ capabilities; thus, emphasizing these features in the 
application process may enhance the possibility of fundraising success. The diverse 
expertise and skill sets within a founding team can signal the innovativeness and 
effectiveness of a social venture.  
Moreover, this research helps social entrepreneurs figure out their strengths and 
weaknesses and consequently build effective social ventures. For instance, a core 
founder’s personal experience with the focal social problem can change his or her pattern 
of recruiting founding team members, which is directly associated with a venture’s 
characteristics. Understanding this process can offer insights to social entrepreneurs to be 
better equipped for the recruitment of founding team members as well as the application 
for funding from VPFs. A core founder with personal experience with the focal social 
problem can also actively utilize the experience to build the strong shared identity of the 
founding team. Social ventures with strong shared identity can effectively improve their 
funding possibilities by focusing on signaling superior mission alignment. On the other 
hand, social ventures composed of like-minded people can prepare for the potential risk 
of groupthink, which lowers the ventures’ level of entrepreneurial orientation. 
Conversely, teams with a high level of dominant function diversity can take a systematic 
approach to enhance their strong entrepreneurial orientation, while contemplating the 
manner of aligning their social mission with the venture’s other components. In 
accordance with the knowledge and experience within the venture, social entrepreneurs 
can generate various strategies to pursue finances from VPFs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although VPFs are emerging as important resource providers for early-stage 
social entrepreneurs, not much scholarly focus has been accorded this topic. Utilizing 
insights from signaling theory and team diversity literature, the current theoretical model 
explicates social ventures’ factors that deliver positive signals to VPFs and how these 
positive signals are created in the venture formation process. This research contributes to 
understanding how early-stage social entrepreneurs and social ventures seek financial 
resources from VPFs to elicit social changes. Furthermore, this research emphasizes that, 
when social entrepreneurs understand their characteristics well, they can better generate 
an effective strategy to obtain the necessary resources from resource providers. I hope 
this research yields new dialogue and research on early-stage social ventures and VPFs.  
.
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CHAPTER 3: LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE IN EARLY-STAGE 
SOCIAL VENTURES: HOW DOES THE FOUNDING TEAM 
SELECT THE FIRST CEO? 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines leadership emergence in early-stage social ventures, 
entrepreneurial organizations aim to solve social problems with business models. The 
first CEO of the social venture plays a crucial role in paving the way for the new 
venture’s success, yet we know little about how the first CEO is selected by founding 
team members. Drawing on insights from human capital theory and expectancy violation 
theory, this study examines the criteria founding teams use when they select one of them 
as the first CEO of social venture. In particular, the current study focuses on how 
founders’ prior occupational experience and gender influence the CEO selection. 
Findings indicate that a founder’s social experience substantially affects his or her 
emergence as the CEO. Additionally, commercial experience enhances a founder’s 
likelihood of becoming the CEO only when the founder is a woman. By accounting for 
leadership emergence in social entrepreneurship context, this study offers important 
implications for social entrepreneurship research.  
INTRODUCTION 
Social ventures have a dualistic nature, integrating social welfare and commercial 
logics at their core (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Wry & York, 2017). This dualism makes 
social ventures distinct from commercial ventures or other organizations that primarily 
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focus on shareholders’ economic prosperity (Dees, 1998). A social venture is built upon 
the founding efforts of core founders who first design the innovative idea of resolving a 
social problem that cannot be eradicated with governmental help or market intervention 
(Hellmann & Wasserman, 2017; Wasserman, 2006). At the beginning of a new venture, 
resources in three major areas (human capital, social capital, and financial capital) are 
usually in limited supply (Morris, Coombes, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2007).To attract 
missing resources, core founders often assemble a founding team, and the team members 
together create essential elements for the venture and set the path to organizational 
success.  
At social ventures’ early stage, founding team members need to select their 
representative, the first CEO. Leadership emergence literature suggests that when group 
members select their leader, they naturally engage in a comparison process between the 
shared image of a prototypical leader and each leader candidate (Neubert & Taggar, 
2004). Founding team members typically select the individual who seems to be a 
prototypical leader as the CEO to maximize the chance to fulfill the collective goal. 
However, we know little about on basis of which criteria social venture founding teams 
would select their first leader. Which specific leadership qualities are valued in the 
organization in which both social mission and profit generation matter? Although less is 
known about the factors that influence the first CEO selection in social ventures, 
understanding the features of the first CEOs is of importance to entrepreneurship scholars 
who are interested in decision making of early-stage founding teams. It is also important 
to impact investors who select and support promising early-stage social ventures, and to 
social entrepreneurs who might compete for the CEO position in now or future.     
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Scholars suggest that founders’ task-relevant human capital, which may provide 
skills specific to a particular job context, has a positive effect on new ventures’ 
performance (Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). In the social entrepreneurship 
context where both economic and social goals are crucial, human capital associated with 
either commercial or social welfare logic might be valued. A conceptual research recently 
coined the concept of “balanced entrepreneur” (Wry & York, 2017), which indicates a 
social entrepreneur with salient role identity related to both commercial logic and social 
welfare logic. These social entrepreneurs have work experiences in commercial firms and 
social mission-oriented organizations; thus, they possess knowledge, competencies, and 
social relations related to both commercial and social welfare domains. They tend to spot 
more opportunities to create social and commercial value, put more efforts into the 
integration of commercial and social welfare logics, and strive to focus on social and 
commercial aims without sacrificing their counterparts with either a commercial or social 
welfare background (Wry & York, 2017). In addition to human capital associated with 
either commercial or social sector, the current study investigates how a social 
entrepreneur’s “balanced” background would operate in leadership emergence. 
 Gender is another important individual characteristic associated with leadership 
emergence (Eagly & Karau, 1991; Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015). According to gender role 
theory (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004) people tend to believe that men have more agentic 
qualities that accompany success in business, whereas women have more communal 
qualities necessary for supporting others. It provides a partial explanation for men’s over-
emergence as leaders in workplace. Applications of this theory show that women who 
perform agentic behaviors likely experience social backlash and are penalized in the 
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workplace (Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015). However, later applications of the theory 
demonstrate that the context where these behaviors occur matters and agentic behaviors 
performed by women are not perceived negatively under specific circumstances 
(Heilman, 2012; Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015). Instead, Expectancy violation theory 
(Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987) predicts that when women engage in positive 
behaviors that are prototypical leader behaviors but atypical for the gender stereotype, 
they are likely to be assessed more positively than men who engage in the same 
behaviors (Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017). Lanaj and 
Hollenbeck (2015) showed that women benefit from a countervailing bias in self-
managing team by engaging in more task behaviors and boundary spanning behaviors. 
Traditionally, male stereotypes are associated with the goals and motivations of 
the commercial sector, whereas female stereotypes are associated with the goals and 
motivations of the social sector (Dimitriadis, Lee, Ramarajan, & Battilana, 2017). In 
social ventures, however, ideal leaders need to be both agentic and communal because of 
the organizational need to serve the financial goal and social mission simultaneously. It 
makes us difficult to predict how gender works in social venture founding team 
members’ evaluation on CEO candidates’ leadership quality. In the current study, I 
propose that expectancy violation theory (Jussim et al., 1987; Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015; 
Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017), rather than gender role theory (Eagly & Karau, 1991) can 
better account for the role of gender with respect to leadership emergence in social 
venture context. In a social venture, a team member whose background is not consistent 
with his or her gender stereotype might be perceived as representing balanced qualities, 
thus is more likely to become the CEO than other team members with gender stereotype-
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consistent background. Specifically, women with prior commercial experience and men 
with prior social experience are more likely to emerge as leaders than men with prior 
commercial experience and women with prior social experience. 
By identifying characteristics of the first CEO of social ventures, this study offers 
a fresh perspective on how human capital and positive gender stereotype violation may 
affect founding teams’ CEO selection. This study makes several theoretical and practical 
contributions. First, it contributes to the social entrepreneurship literature by suggesting 
distinctive leadership characteristics required for becoming the leader in early-stage 
social ventures. Second, this study contributes to human capital theory by discussing 
specific human capital that contributes to the CEO emergence in social entrepreneurship 
context. Research in social entrepreneurship has investigated the influence of human 
capital on opportunity recognition pattern and willingness to start social ventures, but 
only few studies have related human capital to leadership emergence in social 
entrepreneurship contexts. Third, this study contributes to gender issues in the 
entrepreneurship literature by showing how gender affects leader appointments in a social 
venture context. Using expectancy violation theory, this study suggests that people with a 
background in countervailing gender bias are more likely to be seen as leaders than 
people with stereotype-consistent background. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS AND HYPOTHESES 
CEO Selection 
 Classical works by Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Pfeffer (1983) have 
facilitated a major stream of executive succession literature in strategic management. 
Pfeffer (1983) argued that efforts to examine organizational phenomenon are too much 
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concentrated on understanding unobservable psychological factors, and encouraged 
scholars to shift their focus on more structural and observable factors, such as 
organizational demographics. Along the same line, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
developed their upper-echelons theory, which argued that organizational outcomes can be 
explained by background characteristics of management, including demographic 
attributes such as age, education, functional experience, and socioeconomic status 
(Magnusson & Boggs, 2006). Ideas from upper-echelon theory had been extended within 
the field of strategic management and entrepreneurship, and generated tremendous 
research interests in executive succession studies associated CEO or Top Management 
Team (TMT) characteristics with organizational outcomes. Scholars have investigated 
how executive characteristics are related to corporate strategy (Westphal & Fredrickson, 
2001), insider/outsider succession (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003), board 
characteristics(Garg et al., 2017) , and firm characteristics (Guthrie & Datta, 1997).  
Despite tremendous research works on executive succession and its consequences 
in the post-succession era, relatively less academic attention has given to the events 
leading up to CEO selection (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Specifically, most studies have used upper-echelons theory have not provided framework 
to compare individuals assigned as CEOs to candidates who were not selected 
(Magnusson & Boggs, 2006), with only two exceptions. Based on executive successions 
at USA Fortune 200 companies, Magnusson and Boggs (2006) identified international 
experience as a crucial factor associated with the CEO appointment of large corporations. 
Additionally, recent work of Jung, Vissa, and Pich (2017) investigated how founding 
team members allocate task positions when they launch new ventures. Drawing on status 
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characteristics theory, they found co-founders with high diffuse status cues of 
gender(male), ethnicity(white), or achievement (academic honors/occupational prestige) 
could predict the occupation of higher-ranked positions, such as CEO.    
 This study aims to contribute to the budding CEO selection literature in 
entrepreneurship by investigating the characteristics, including human capital and 
demographic characteristics, of co-founders who are considered for CEOs when founding 
team members launching social ventures. Social ventures are distinctive from traditional 
ventures or large corporations by its dual financial and social goal and strong orientation 
towards social innovation. Due to this uniqueness in nature of organization, social 
venture founding team members might rely on different criteria and process in the 
selection of their first CEO from commercial firms or charitable organizations. In the 
following section, I discuss characteristics of social venture CEO candidates that might 
affect the CEO appointment by taking the perspective of human capital theory.   
Human Capital Theory and Social Entrepreneurship 
Human capital represents the knowledge and skills that individuals bring to an 
organization (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). It is developed through education and previous 
experience and thus contributes to the firm’s explicit and tacit knowledge. The 
fundamental argument of human capital theory is that the better the human capital within 
the firm, the better the firm’s performance in particular tasks (Becker, 1975; Dimov & 
Shepherd, 2005). Specifically, individuals’ knowledge and experience increase their 
cognitive abilities, leading to more productive and efficient activities (Becker, 1975; 
Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Therefore, entrepreneurs with greater or higher quality of 
human capital can better perceive and exploit opportunities for new value creation. 
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Research in entrepreneurship has supported the positive effect of human capital on 
entrepreneurial outcomes, such as the start of entrepreneurship or self-employment, new 
venture formation, and new venture growth and survival (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; 
Dimov & Shepherd, 2005).  
The human capital literature distinguishes between general human capital, 
typically acquired through formal education and overall life experience, and specific 
human capital, which is obtained via experience specific to a particular activity or context 
(Becker, 1975; Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2016). Research efforts have mainly 
focused on how general human capital, including age, education, and years of work 
experience affect organizational outcomes. According to the literature, general human 
capital encourages motivation to engage in start-up activities (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; 
Estrin et al., 2016) and increases the likelihood of fund-raising success (Gimmon & 
Levie, 2010), venture performance (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Davidsson & Honig, 
2003), and venture survival (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). 
However, recent arguments suggest that specific human capital, which is more 
closely related to creating value in a specific venture context but limited in its 
applicability across multiple industries, is likely a more proximal predictor of venture 
outcomes (Dimov, 2010). Specific human capital represents the degree of similarity 
between a new venture and the organization where the entrepreneur had previously 
worked (Gimeno et al., 1997). Specific human capital accrued through task-specific 
experiences helps entrepreneurs select knowledge more relevant to the firm’s success, 
especially in cases where experience is both firm and industry specific (Kor, 2003; 
Scarlata, Zacharakis, & Walske, 2016). Considering the dualistic nature of social 
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ventures, I investigate two specific human capital of founders: prior commercial 
experience and prior social experience. These are associated with the venture’s goal of 
social mission and of profit generation, respectively.   
Prior Commercial Experience and Leadership Emergence 
Even though social and traditional entrepreneurs differ in their ultimate goals and 
ways of creating value, they both need to acquire external resources in their 
organizations’ early operation to move into the next step (Estrin et al., 2016). In 
particular, like commercial ventures, early-stage social ventures must acquire seed capital 
from external investors to create viable product or service (Dimov & Murray, 2008) as 
most founders lack sufficient capital to finance projects in general (Gompers & Lerner, 
1998). The external financing of seed capital reduces the uncertainty of business 
circumstances and offers advantages where professional investors provide guidance and 
advice to new ventures (Dimov & Murray, 2008; Gompers & Lerner, 1998). Therefore, 
one of the primary duties of a social venture’s first CEO is to attract financial resources 
from external investors. 
Typical funding sources for early-stage social ventures are impact investors 
include social venture capitalists (SVCs), philanthropic venture capitalists (PhVC), and 
fellowship foundations (Nicholls, 2012) . These funding organizations aim to create 
social wealth by financially and strategically supporting organizations pursue social 
changes. The funding decision rules of impact investors are unique because of the dual 
goal and identity of organizations they support (Miller & Wesley, 2010). For instance, 
assessment factors of SVCs include attributes unique to social ventures such as social 
mission, an entrepreneur’s passion for social change, and community-based networks. In 
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addition to these attributes, SVCs also importantly consider entrepreneurial and 
commercial attributes such as business experience, innovation capabilities, and 
educational prestige (Miller & Wesley, 2010). Research provides empirical evidences 
that the greater the entrepreneur’s management experience is, the less likely SVCs is to 
evaluate the venture as uncertain (Miller & Wesley, 2010). Scholars also found that 
SVCs tend to put much weight on entrepreneurial and commercial attributes in decisions 
on social ventures to support (Miller & Wesley, 2010; Scarlata & Alemany, 2009; 
Scarlata et al., 2016). These findings imply that impact investors select social ventures 
that can be economically sustainable, because only economically sustainable social 
ventures can grow and survive and, consequently, create the intended social impact 
(Scarlata & Alemany, 2009).  
Past research provided both theoretical support and empirical evidence that 
founders’ human capital conveys an important signal about ventures’ potential for future 
performance, thus enhances fundraising performance (Hsu, 2007). To enhance the 
signaling of a social venture’s economic viability to external investors, team members 
would importantly consider an individual’s previous commercial experience in the CEO 
selection. Therefore, I propose that a founder’s prior commercial experience might be of 
value in the social venture and will enhance the possibility of the founder becoming the 
CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 1: A founder’s prior commercial experience is positively 
related to the likelihood of the founder becoming the first CEO. 
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Prior Social Experience and Leadership Emergence 
 
Dees (2002) posited that a social mission forms the key distinction between social 
ventures and traditional ventures. Impact investors regard social ventures’ mission, social 
entrepreneurs’ authenticity and passion for social change, and ethical orientation as 
critical assessment factors in addition to dimensions related to entrepreneurial and 
commercial activities (Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012). Social experience 
refers to an entrepreneur’s previous work experience in government ministries or 
government agencies, or enterprises with a social aim, and of starting and managing an 
enterprise with the intention to make a social impact (Scarlata et al., 2016). By engaging 
in activities in such organizations, individuals can form role identities as social activists 
and accumulate relevant knowledge on solving societal problems and applying these 
solutions across multiple contexts. Thus, an entrepreneur’s social experience can improve 
the credibility of the social venture as it can enhance the venture’s ability to address its 
social mission.  
The distinctive features of a CEO’s knowledge and expertise can make the 
difference in social ventures’ primary goals and orientation. Wry and York (2017) 
suggested that the CEO’s role identity associated with knowledge and competencies in a 
particular domain likely determines the social venture’s approach to address its social 
mission. For instance, CEOs with knowledge and competencies in social welfare areas 
tend to seek the maximization of social impact in opportunity development. These CEOs 
are less likely to lose sight of their purpose and values in the quest for organizational 
efficiency (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). Thus, a CEO’s social experience can 
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affect the venture’s credibility in its support of social mission and consequently affect the 
venture’s chances of acquire funding from impact investors. 
Considering the mission-oriented nature of social ventures, I suggest that a 
founder’s social experience might increase team members’ expectation on the founder’s 
contributions to the venture’s performance. Therefore, a founder’s social experience 
might enhance the possibility of occupying the CEO position. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A founder’s prior social experience is positively related to 
the likelihood of the founder becoming the first CEO. 
 
Balanced Entrepreneurs and Leadership Emergence 
 
Some founders of social ventures have accumulated work experience in both the 
social and commercial sector. Wry and York (2017) called these social entrepreneurs 
“balanced entrepreneurs” as they hold multiple role identities relevant to different logics 
(Stryker, 1980). Research shows that past work roles often remain salient because people 
preserve knowledge, capabilities, and social relationships from previous jobs (Dokko, 
Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009; Wry & York, 2017). When prior knowledge and skills are 
similar to new knowledge related to the current task, new knowledge acquisition becomes 
easier (Levinthal, 1989; Unger et al., 2011). 
 Therefore, balanced entrepreneurs with both commercial and social sector 
experience can better adapt to the social entrepreneurship context and more effectively 
transfer knowledge from the previous workplace to the new setting, compared with 
entrepreneurs with either commercial or social work experience. This fast understanding 
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creates a high expectation among team members about the balanced entrepreneur’s 
potential contribution to the new venture. Furthermore, when an individual has past work 
experience in both commercial and social sectors and possesses role identities related to 
each area, founding team members form high expectations of the individual’s capability 
to pursue two different goals at the same time. In line with the arguments so far, I suggest 
that when a founder is a balanced entrepreneur, the possibility of becoming the CEO is 
higher than when a founder has work experience only in either commercial or social 
sector. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A founder who is a balanced entrepreneur is more likely to 
be the CEO than a founder with either prior social experience or 
commercial experience. 
 
Gender Stereotypes in Business, Entrepreneurship, and Leadership Emergence 
 
Even though the number of women occupying executive positions has been 
continuously increasing(Lee & James, 2007), gender stereotypes, defined as a shared 
belief of the characteristics and attributes related to each gender (Gupta, Turban, Wasti, 
& Sikdar, 2009), are still common in the business and entrepreneurship world (Lee & 
James, 2007). The extant literature provides underpinnings for the shared belief that 
women are less competent and qualified than men to manage a successful business. For 
instance, investors show more skepticism and negative responses about new female 
CEOs’ expertise and expected future contributions to the firm than the expertise and 
expected future contributions of male CEOs (Lee & James, 2007). Moreover, female 
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entrepreneurs tend to have more difficulty obtaining financial resources than their male 
counterparts (Brooks, Huang, Kearney, & Murray, 2014; Buttner & Rosen, 1989; Fuller-
Love, Lim, & Akehurst, 2006) because female entrepreneurs are seen as less competent 
and unwilling to take challenges from external investors (Gupta et al., 2009). Gender 
stereotypes also affect the status-organizing process within entrepreneurial teams (Berger 
& Fişek, 2006; Chen, Peterson, Phillips, Podolny, & Ridgeway, 2012; Jung, 2017). For 
instance, Jung, Vissa, and Pitch (2017) showed that in new commercial ventures, men are 
better placed to take a hierarchically high-ranked position, such as CEO, whereas women 
are likely to take a hierarchically low-ranked position, such as CMO or COO. 
Overall, gender role theory (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004) and the prior literature on 
gender stereotypes has theorized and empirically supported the notion that communal 
qualities related to feminine gender stereotypes (expressiveness, connectedness, 
relatedness, kindness, supportiveness, relationship-oriented) are considered inconsistent 
with qualities required for business success and thus less valued than qualities related to 
masculine gender stereotypes (independence, aggressiveness, autonomy, task-oriented). 
Categorization theory suggests that a judgment of another individual is made by the 
congruence between the person and prototype or exemplar (Fraser & Lord, 1988; Neubert 
& Taggar, 2004). In commercial organizations, including commercial ventures, agentic 
qualities believed to be more associated with masculine gender stereotypes are 
considered essential for success. Because of this common belief, men are more likely to 
be viewed as leaders in such contexts (Neubert & Taggar, 2004), which results in male-
dominated tendencies in leadership positions in business. 
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However, gender role theorists also posit that the biasing effect of gender status 
on self-other performance expectations varies across all situations (Ridgeway, 2001). The 
diagnostic value of gender status beliefs can vary depending on how salient and task 
relevant gender is in a situation compared with other social roles and status-valued social 
distinctions are salient for participants (Ridgeway, 2001; Wagner & Berger, 1997). Thus, 
the negative effects of gender stereotypes in leadership emergence are context specific 
rather than universal. For instance, if positive social behaviors were to become especially 
important to a group’s success, women might emerge as leaders more often because of 
their greater attention to group morale and positive interpersonal relations (Eagly & 
Karau, 1991).  
Characteristics in a workplace described as essentially feminine include 
heightened communication skills (especially the ability to be a good listener and 
empathetic), advanced intermediary skills (for negotiation and conflict resolution), well-
developed interpersonal skills, and a soft approach to handling people (Appelbaum, 
Audet, & Miller, 2003). These characteristics are consistent with the attributes needed to 
do charitable and noncommercial work (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Teasdale, Mckay, 
Phillimore, & Teasdale, 2011). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring survey indicated 
that women are almost as likely as men (around four women for every five men) to be 
involved in social entrepreneurial activity (Teasdale et al., 2011). This ratio favorably 
compares with that of more than twice as many men as women in commercial 
entrepreneurial activity (Harding, 2007).  
In sum, previous research has shown that women in the workplace tend to 
demonstrate better people-oriented leadership skills compared with men with better 
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business-oriented leadership skills. Because of these differences, leadership skills 
associated with feminine characteristics tend to be highly valued in the social sector, 
whereas masculine leadership characteristics tend to be associated with success in the 
commercial sector. Social ventures have both commercial and social aspects within 
organizational boundaries, which makes it difficult to predict the role of the 
entrepreneur’s gender in leadership emergence in social entrepreneurship. 
Moderating Influence of Gender on Leadership Emergence  
 
One of the distinctive characteristics of social ventures is their requirement to 
satisfy multiple stakeholders with varying claims (Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, & 
Amezcua, 2013). For instance, for some social ventures, the beneficiaries of 
products/services are not the same as those who pay for products/services. Social 
ventures need to rely on both to generate community support, gain access to resources, 
and enable beneficiaries to enact positive social change (Lumpkin et al., 2013). After 
investigating leadership attributes in successful social entrepreneurship, Alvord et al. 
(2004) found that the capacities for bridging and adaptive leadership are present in most 
successful social ventures. Further, the leaders of social ventures are required to identify 
key stakeholders in creating the kind of transformational change they envision. They 
must develop strategies for overcoming challenges and strengthening allies. Overall, the 
leader’s ability to form and maintain relationships with multiple stakeholders with 
different needs is essential for a social venture’s venture. 
To create the intended social impact, social ventures need to be economically 
sustainable (Lumpkin et al., 2013). Fundraising and profit generation are critical to the 
creation of social wealth as well as the social venture’s long-term survival. Thus, 
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commercial activities are crucial for sustaining the operation of social ventures. To be 
economically sustainable, social ventures have been increasingly utilizing commercial 
practices that generate revenue. However, too much focus on commercial activities can 
distract the venture from serving its social mission, leading to “mission drift.” Therefore, 
a major challenge that social ventures often face is achieving the balance in resource 
allocation trade-offs between commercial activities and activities that directly advance 
their social missions. Further, new social venture leaders should strive to reconcile 
differences among founding team members, particularly their relative orientation toward 
social and commercial goal achievement (Almandoz, 2014; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Dimitriadis et al., 2017).  
To summarize, ideal leaders in social ventures should be capable of managing 
multiple stakeholders with different needs and the delicate balance between social and 
financial goal. Managing multiple stakeholders requires a high level of communication 
and interpersonal skills, which are associated with female stereotypes, while focusing on 
economic sustainability requires a high level of task orientation, which is generally 
associated with male stereotypes. Accordingly, leader prototypes in social 
entrepreneurship are associated with aspects of both female and male stereotypes. In this 
case, how would an individual’s gender be associated with the CEO selection in early-
stage social ventures? 
According to expectancy violation theory (Jussim et al., 1987; Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002), individuals who display positive counter-stereotypical traits are 
evaluated more positively than those who display positive stereotype traits (Lanaj & 
Hollenbeck, 2015; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017). For instance, people tend to respond 
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more favorably to eloquent football players than eloquent members of an academic 
speech team (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017) 
and they applaud male fashion writers more than female fashion writers(Bettencourt et 
al., 2001; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2017). A violator is believed to have positive stereotype 
characteristics by nature of his or her group membership and positive counter-stereotype 
qualities by nature of his or her particular exhibition of these traits (Schaumberg & Flynn, 
2017). Therefore, people often offer the greatest status and prestige to an individual who 
is deemed to positively violate stereotypes of the group of which individual has a 
membership (Kark, Waismel-Manor, & Shamir, 2012; Powell, Butterfield, & Bartol, 
2008). Therefore, in certain context, women who engage in more task-oriented behaviors 
are more likely to emerge as leaders even if the same behaviors are demonstrated by men 
as well (Lanaj & Hollenbeck, 2015).  
Typically, characteristics such as being competitive, risk taking, task-oriented, 
and agentic have been associated with male stereotypes and are believed to be consistent 
with the goals and motivations of commercial firms (Dimitriadis et al., 2017). Thus, 
women with prior commercial experience might be perceived as possessing attributes of 
male stereotypes, which are assumed lacking for women, in addition to attributes of 
female stereotypes consistent with gender. Yet, founding team members would predict 
men with prior commercial experience, whose background is consistent with gender, 
might prioritize profit generation over the achievement of the social mission. This is 
because men with commercial background are assumed to only have attributes related to 
male stereotype. Based on the argument so far, I suggest that women with prior 
commercial experience are more likely to emerge as CEOs than their men counterparts.  
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Hypothesis 4: Gender will moderate the relationship between prior 
commercial experience and the likelihood of becoming the CEO such that 
female founders with prior commercial experience will be more likely to 
become CEOs than male founders with prior commercial experience. 
 
Drawing on people’s favorable response to positive expectancy violation, I argue 
that prior work experience in the social welfare sector positively signals men’s higher 
capabilities for communication and service of both social and financial missions 
compared with women. Traditionally, gender role theory associates women with personal 
qualities, such as caring, communal, kind, and empathetic—attributes consistent with the 
goals and motivations of the social sector (Dimitriadis et al., 2017). Men with prior 
experience in the social sector might be seen to have qualities relevant to serving social 
goals in addition to agentic qualities related to male stereotypes appropriate for serving 
financial goals. However, women from a social sector background are believed to lean 
toward social motivations and goals when the organization requires a balance between 
social and financial goals. Thus, women founders with social sector background are less 
positively evaluated as ideal leaders by other team members than men from the same 
background. Taken together, I suggest that men with prior social experience are more 
likely to emerge as leaders than women with prior social experience.  
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Hypothesis 5: Gender will moderate the relationship between prior social 
experience and the likelihood of becoming the CEO such that male 
founders with prior social experience will be more likely to become CEOs 
than female founders with prior social experience. 
 
Gender of Balanced Entrepreneurs and Leadership Emergence 
 
Entrepreneurship research has stated that firms founded and run by women tend to 
have distinctive features from those created by men (Baron, Hannan, Hsu, & Koçak, 
2007). A meta-analysis by Eagly and Johnson (1990), which reviewed studies comparing 
the leadership styles of men and women, found that female leaders tend to adopt a more 
democratic and participative and less autocratic or directive style than male leaders (Kark 
et al., 2012). In the same vein, several studies showed that women are perceived, and 
perceive themselves, as using transformational leadership styles more than men (Bass, 
Avolio, & Atwater, 1996; Kark, 2004; Rosener, 2001). For instance, Eagly et al. (2003) 
found that women were rated higher than men in factors related to transformational 
leadership, whereas men were rated higher on transactional leadership scales. Overall, 
research has supported the notion that female leaders tend to be seen as transformational 
leaders who foster positive interactions and trust relations among subordinates, share 
power and information, and encourage employees to subordinate their personal aims and 
interests to collective ends (Kark, 2004).  
One of the desirable leadership qualities of leaders in social ventures is to build 
and manage a number of relationships with multiple stakeholders. Female leaders are 
expected to display the features of transformational leaders, such as savvy relationship 
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skills, paying attention to the needs of people inside and outside the venture, and offering 
developmental support and coaching. Leaders with these characteristics are likely to 
manage well the various needs of investors, beneficiaries, and team members and to 
provide essential support to stakeholders. Accordingly, female founders with past 
experience in both social and commercial sectors are more likely to emerge as leaders 
than their male counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Gender will moderate the relationship between balanced 
experience and the likelihood of becoming the CEO such that female 
balanced entrepreneurs are more likely to become CEOs than male 
balanced entrepreneurs. 
 
 
Model 2: Theoretical Model 
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METHODS 
Sample 
Echoing Green is a 30-year-old non-profit grant-offering foundation, providing 
seed-stage funding and strategic support for promising early-stage social ventures to 
drive positive social change. Once a year, Echoing Green selects fellows with an 
innovative solution for diverse social issues, including poverty alleviation, food security, 
environmental problems, climate change, and social justice. Echoing Green has provided 
over $36 million in seed-stage funding to social ventures in start-up phase, generally 
within the first two years of operations. Organizations still in the idea phase are also 
eligible to apply. Echoing Green takes a highly selective process for choosing promising 
social ventures. On average, Echoing Green receives more than 25,000 applications in a 
year, but only around 30 fellows are selected. The selection process is composed of 
multiple stages and includes online applications, essays, budgets, letters of reference, in-
person pitches, and panel interviews. Currently in 2018, Echoing Green Fellows receive 
up to $90,000 of unrestricted funding for their organizations that can be spent on 
anything, and can get the reimbursement for health insurance payments up to $4,000 a 
year. Additionally, each Fellow receives $1,000 a year for professional development.  
Unlike other prominent impact investors, such as Ashoka, Skoll Foundation, and 
Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship that provide awards to leading social 
ventures with substantial social impact, Echoing Green identifies and supports emerging 
social entrepreneurs in their early-stages and help them to launch new organizations. As 
the primary focus of the current research is the founders of early-stage social ventures, I 
chose Echoing Green fellows from 1990 to 2017 for the investigation. Data is mainly 
collected from the Echoing Green website. As a supplemental source of information 
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related to previous work experiences and founding motivations, I used social ventures’ 
websites and LinkedIn, one of the largest business-oriented professional networking 
websites, and founders’ interviews published in magazines and newspapers.    
As this research aims to investigate leadership emergence in social ventures with 
social and financial objective, I only included founding team members of for-profit and 
hybrid social ventures in the sample. For-profit social ventures refer to entrepreneurial 
organizations that are legally incorporated as for-profit entities, but explicitly designed to 
serve a social purpose (Dees & Anderson, 2003). While hybrid social ventures are 
nonprofit organizations but are operating commercial activities to profit generation within 
their structure. Even though for-profit and hybrid social ventures seemingly indistinctive 
in their objectives and operations, hybrids are legally not allowed to distribute economic 
profits to their stakeholders, as they are categorized as nonprofits. Initially, the sample 
includes 310 social entrepreneurs from 155 for-profit or hybrid social ventures.  
As this study examines leadership emergence in a founding team, I excluded 49 
one-person social ventures. For testing Hypothesis 1 to 3, I used the sample of 261 social 
entrepreneurs from 108 social ventures. As the primary focus of Hypothesis 4 to 6 is 
related to social entrepreneurs’ gender, I excluded 62 social ventures created by same-
gender founding teams. The sample used to test Hypothesis 4 to 6 includes 115 social 
entrepreneurs from 44 social ventures. Due to the missing information, the final sample 
for testing Hypothesis 1 to 3 includes the information of 241 social entrepreneurs, and the 
final sample for testing Hypothesis 4 to 6 includes the information of 111 social 
entrepreneurs.  
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Validity Check: Interrater Reliability 
 
Data was mainly collected and coded by the author according to coding protocol 
(Appendix B). Based on the information from sources, the author coded each founder’s 
demographic data and other background information. Information of social ventures was 
obtained from multiple sources. However, the current study’s research method can raise 
the question of consistency or agreement among the individuals collecting data due to the 
variability among human observers (Mchugh, 2012). The most credible way to address 
concerns of validity is to check interrater reliability: the results and differences among 
trained research assistants coding each set of information. To check interrater reliability, 
studies must include procedures that calculate agreement among data collectors. The 
study design needs to incorporate training the data collectors and measuring the extent to 
which they record the same scores for the same phenomena (Mchugh, 2012). Following 
suggestions from previous studies, I checked interrater reliability (Fleiss’ kappa) for two 
indicators that required the judgment of coders, ‘core founder’ and ‘primary motivation 
of founding a social venture,’ before conducting the main analysis. 
To examine the interrater reliability of two indicators that require a judgment, 
‘core founder’ and ‘primary motivation of founding a social venture,’ the author and two 
research assistants (unfamiliar with this study’s hypotheses) coded 20% of the data 
separately. First, coders identified the core founder in each founding team. A core 
founder refers to an individual who initiates the idea of establishing a venture and 
suggests the earliest outline of it (Wasserman, 2006) and ventures often have more than 
one core founder. Second, coders classified the motivation of each core fonder who 
primarily drives formation of the current social venture. After reading the founding story 
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and core founders’ interviews from articles, coders recognized whether core founders’ 
motivation was triggered by specific personal experiences with the focal social problem.   
The Fleiss’ Kappa is an adaptation of Cohen’s Kappa for three or more raters. A 
number of benchmarks for interpreting Kappa have been provided. Hartmann (1977) 
argues that Kappa values should exceed 0.6. Altman (1991) offered much detailed 
benchmark. Specifically, Kappa values lower than 0.2 is slight agreement, 0.21-0.4 is fair 
agreement, 0.41-0.6 is moderate agreement, 0.61-0.8 is substantial agreement, and higher 
than 0.81 is almost perfect agreement. He also mentioned that any value of Kappa below 
0.5 would indicate poor agreement. Fleiss (1981) also presented benchmarks for 
interpreting Kappa; Poor: < .40, Intermediate to Good: .40 to .75, Excellent: More than 
0.75 (Fleiss, 1981; Gwet, 2014). The interrater reliability analysis shows that Kappa for 
‘core founder’ is .67, and ‘primary motivation of founding a social venture’ is .61. Both 
Kappa values exceed 0.6 and show good agreement or intermediate to good agreement.  
Dependent Variable 
 
CEO.  Following the previous study (Jung, 2017), I created dummy variable for a 
founder’s job title: When a founder is a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 1 was given, and 
if a founder holds another job title, such as a Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief 
Strategy Officer (CSO), or Chief Financial Officer (CFO), it was coded as 0. Among 43 
social ventures in the sample, 4 social ventures have more than one CEOs.  
Independent Variables 
 
Prior commercial experience. A founders’ prior commercial experience was 
conceptualized as a founder’s work experience at commercial companies (Beckman & 
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Burton, 2008; Scarlata et al., 2016). It included a founder’s occupational experience at 
venture capital (VC) firms, financial experience, senior management experience, 
consulting experience, entrepreneurial experience as a founder and an employee of a 
startup, and other work experience at commercially motivated firms (adapted from 
Scarlata et al., 2016). VC experience indicated core founders’ prior experience of 
working in a traditional venture capital. Financial experience includes investment 
banking, options trading, commercial banking, and mutual fund portfolio management 
(Scarlata et al., 2016). Senior management experience includes work experience as CEO, 
COO, CSO, and CFO in companies where the focal individual is not a founder. The sum 
of months that spent on each experience was measured.  
Prior social experience. Social experience indicates prior work experience in 
organizations with a primary social aim. Social experiences include a founder’s prior 
work experience in SVCs or PhVCs, senior management experience at organizations with 
a social aim, government or government agencies, and founding experience or work 
experience at a venture with a social aim, and other work experience at organizations 
with a primary social aim (adapted from Scarlata et al., 2016). Senior management 
experience indicates work experience as CEO, COO, CSO, and CFO in organizations 
with a social aim, where the focal individual is not a founder. Government experience 
indicates work experience in a government branch or for international governmental 
organizations aimed at promoting economic development and social progress. The sum of 
months that spent on each experience was measured.  
Balanced entrepreneur. Balanced entrepreneurs concurrently hold salient role 
identities that align with commercial logic and social welfare logic (Wry & York, 2017). 
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Therefore, balanced entrepreneurs have occupational experiences in both commercial 
firms and organizations that aim to create social impact. A founder was categorized as a 
balanced entrepreneur when a person had more than 12 months of work experiences in 
both commercial and social area. Balanced entrepreneurs are coded as “1”, and non-
balanced entrepreneurs are coded as “0”.   
Moderator 
Gender.  Each founder’s gender was coded as dummy variable: male = 0; female 
= 1.  
Control Variables 
Control variables were collected across three levels: a founder level, a founding 
team level, and a venture level. At a founder level, whether a founder is a core founder or 
not is measured and collected. Additionally, a founder’s highest level of completed 
degree, elite education at undergraduate and graduate level, race/ethnicity, research 
experience, and motivation related to personal experience with the focal social problem 
were measured and controlled.  
Among 106 social ventures that have more than one founding team members, 
majority has one core founder. Fourteen social ventures have two core founders, four 
social ventures have three core founders, and three social ventures have more than four 
core founders. Core founder is coded as “1”, and non-core founder is coded as “0”. The 
founding team member’s education was measured in two different ways. Firstly, the 
highest level of completed degrees was coded into one of following categories: 1= 
Bachelor’s or less, 2=Master’s, 3=Higher professional degrees. Organizational 
researchers posited that a manager’s educational background, specifically attendance at 
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certain school, can signal prominence (D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 2001). Thus, elite 
education is measured as well. Based on the list elite universities of Finkelstein (1992), 
the variable was coded as “0” when the entrepreneur did not attend elite school, and if he 
or she has undergraduate or post-graduate degree from elite school, it was coded as “1”.  
Race/ethnicity was coded into one of following categories: White=1, Otherwise=0.  
Research experience refers to prior research experience at an educational institution, 
government agencies, or other research institution, and months spent on these 
organizations are coded.  
 At the founding team level, the founding team’s size and task-relevant diversity 
based on team members’ functional experiences and sectors are assessed and controlled. 
Prior functional experience was based on the team members’ previous three jobs 
(Beckman, Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007). The Shannon index is calculated as − ∑ 𝑃𝑖 (𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖), 
for i = 1 to x, where x is the number of categories, and Pi is the proportion of team 
members with experience in category i. Adapting the previous study (Beckman et al., 
2007), I used eight functional categories (production and operations, R&D, and 
engineering, accounting and finance, management and administration, sales and 
marketing, law, personnel and labor relations, and others). Lastly, at the venture level, 
organizational type (hybrid, for-profit) was coded and controlled. Hybrid social ventures 
are coded as 0, and for-profit social ventures are coded as 1. 
Analysis 
 
 Data in this study was analyzed using logistics regression analysis (Hennart, 
1997; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). For testing hypotheses regarding the 
moderating role of gender, I used inteff command in STATA (Ai & Norton, 2003; 
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Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). Prior to running the logistics regression, a correlation 
analysis was prepared (Table 1). None of the significant correlations appears to be high  
enough to demand concern about multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1995).  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Note: N = 241  *p < .05 **p < .01 
 
 (cont’d) 
 
 
Note: N = 241  *p < .05 **p < .01 
 
 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 CEO 0.47 0.50 1.00       
2 Commercial experience 33.93 57.29 -0.08 1.00      
3 Social experience 23.13 38.60 0.19** -0.11 1.00     
4 Balanced entrepreneur 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.31** 0.30*
* 
1.00    
5 Female 0.32 0.47 0.07 -0.12 0.04 -0.02 1.00   
6 Core founder 0.61 0.49 0.53** -
0.22** 
0.07 -0.06 0.06 1.00  
7 Research experience 9.63 32.24 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.02 1.00 
8 Elite School 0.60 0.49 0.12* -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.12* 0.10 -0.03 
9 Highest level of completed 
education 
1.70 0.71 -0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.41*
* 
10 Race 0.50 0.50 0.04 -
0.17** 
0.14* 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 
11 Founding motivation 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 0.13* -0.05 
12 Team functional diversity 2.34 1.32 -0.14* 0.24** 0.15* 0.32*
* 
-0.03 -0.14* 0.05 
13 Founding team size 2.73 1.01 -0.23** -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 -0.08 -0.13* 0.09 
14 Organization type 0.49 0.50 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 
Variables 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8 Elite School 1.00       
9 Highest level of completed 
education 
0.13* 1.00      
10 Race 0.14* 0.04 1.00     
11 Founding motivation -0.17** -0.03 -0.35** 1.00    
12 Team functional diversity -0.11 0.11 -0.11 -0.06 1.00   
13 Founding team size 0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.30** 1.00  
14 Organization type -0.03 0.16* -0.03 0.05 0.31** -0.11 1.00 
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RESULTS 
 
 Three tests were ran to examine the impact of previous work experience and 
demographic background for the CEO emergence together and separately. Table 2 reports 
the results of hypotheses testing. Hypothesis 1 predicted that a founder’s commercial 
experience would increase the possibility of becoming the CEO. The coefficient on the 
commercial experience indicator variable in Model 2 of Table 2 is not statistically 
significantly, thus failing to support Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 proposed that a founder’s 
social experience would contribute to becoming the CEO. The coefficient on the social 
experience indicator variable in Model 2 of Table 2 is positive and significant (p<.01), 
supporting Hypothesis 2. Figure 1 displays the main effect of social experience on the 
possibility of becoming the CEO. Hypothesis 3 argued that when a founder has working 
experiences in both commercial firms and organizations with a primary social aim, the 
founder is likely to be the CEO. The coefficient on balanced entrepreneur indicator 
variable in Model 2 of Table 2 is not significantly significant, thus Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported.  
Figure 1: Main Effects of Social Experience on the Predicted Probability of becoming CEO 
 
 Note. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2: Results of Logistics Regression 
 
  Dependent variable: CEO=1, Otherwise=0 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Control model Main effects Individual level Interactions 
 
Control variables 
    
Core founder 2.516*** 
(0.000) 
2.760*** 
(0.000) 
2.97*** 
(0.000) 
3.696*** 
(0.000) 
Female -0.024 
(0.944) 
-0.085 
(0.814) 
-0.866 
(0.276) 
-1.804** 
(0.062) 
Race 0.115 
(0.735) 
0.007 
(0.984) 
-0.282 
(0.624) 
-0.229 
(0.738) 
Founding motivation 0.140 
(0.774) 
0.204 
(0.693) 
0.948 
(0.322) 
0.515 
(0.637) 
Research experience  -0.005 
(0.473) 
-0.008 
(0.251) 
-0.009 
(0.538) 
-0.012 
(0.476) 
Highest educational 
degree= Master’s degree 
0.684† 
(0.057) 
0.690† 
(0.063) 
0.872 
(0.191) 
1.043 
(0.170) 
Highest educational 
degree=PhD or 
Professional degree 
0.174 
(0.753) 
0.531 
(0.374) 
0.505 
(0.604) 
1.418 
(0.231) 
Elite education 0.260 
(0.449) 
0.321 
(0.372) 
0.305 
(0.601) 
1.127 
(0.121) 
Founding team size -0.477** 
(0.009) 
-0.403* 
(0.029) 
 -0.900** 
(0.006) 
Team functional 
diversity 
-0.088 
(0.544) 
-0.254 
(0.118) 
 -0.422 
(0.173) 
Organization type -0.160 
(0.277) 
0.096 
(0.797) 
 0.086 
(0.909) 
 
Independent variables 
    
Commercial experience  0.004 
(0.163) 
-0.031† 
(0.064) 
-0.025 
(0.158) 
Social experience  0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.837) 
0.008 
(0.620) 
Balanced entrepreneur  0.033 
(0.944) 
1.898 
(0.205) 
1.374 
(0.402) 
Interactions     
Commercial experience 
X Female  
  0.071** 
(0.006) 
0.075** 
(0.007) 
Social experience X 
Female 
  0.019 
(0.275) 
0.018 
(0.412) 
Balanced entrepreneur X 
Female 
  -3.154† 
(0.089) 
-1.726 
(0.410) 
df 11 14 14 17 
LR 𝑥2 87.97*** 99.56*** 58.65*** 72.78*** 
Log likelihood -125.10 -116.80 -46.60 -39.63 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.48 
Observations 245 241 111 111 
 
Notes: ***p <0.001 ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that female founders with prior commercial experience 
will be more likely to become CEOs than male founders with prior commercial 
experience. The coefficient of the interaction between commercial experience and female 
gender in Model 3 of Table 2 is positive and statistically significant (p<.01). Figure 2 
describes differing effects of gender on the relationship between commercial experience 
and the possibility of becoming the CEO. In Hypothesis 5, I argued that male founders 
with prior social experience will be more likely to become CEOs than female founders 
with prior social experience. The coefficient on the interaction between social experience  
and female in Model 3 of Table 2 is not statistically significant, thus failing to support 
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 predicted that female balanced entrepreneurs are more likely 
to be the first CEO than their male counterparts. The coefficient on the interaction 
between balanced entrepreneur and female is negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.5), thus failing to support Hypothesis 6.  
Figure 2: Interaction Effects of Commercial experience and Gender on the Predicted 
Probability of becoming CEO 
 
Note. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
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However, as noted by Ai and Norton (2003), the impact of an interaction in a non-
linear model is not simply the coefficient for the interaction. Because there are two 
additive terms and each can be positive or negative, the interaction effect may have 
different signs for different values of covariates. In this case, besides the interpretation of 
the significance of the z-statistics of the coefficient, a graphical presentation of the 
interaction term for the different observations is almost required (Hoetker, 2007; 
Mazzola, Perrone, & Kamuriwo, 2015). Therefore, I use the Norton, Wang, and Ai 
(2004)’s methodology (inteff command in STATA) which recommended for computing 
the marginal effects of interaction terms in logit models.   
Figure 3: Interaction Effects of Commercial Experience and Female Gender after Logit 
Regression 
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In Figure 3, the interaction term between commercial experience and gender is 
positive for all observations, which confirms that there exists positive interaction effect. 
Also, the sign of the z-statistics of all observations are positive. Additionally, the z-
statistics significance is quiet good; looking at Figure 4, most of observations of 
individuals whose possibility of becoming the CEO is between 0.2 and 0.8, the z-
statistics are above the red line delimiting the significance. Therefore, the interaction 
effect is positive, and statistically significant. It broadly confirms the support for 
Hypothesis 4.  
Figure 4: Interaction Effects of Social Experience and Female Gender after Logit 
Regression 
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Figure 4 presented for the interaction effects of social experience and gender on 
the possibility of becoming the CEO. For most founding team members the interaction 
term is negative, but z-statistics graph shows that the interaction term is not statistically 
significant. It confirms the rejection for Hypothesis 5. Figure 5 shows the interaction 
effect between balanced entrepreneur and gender on the possibility of becoming CEO. 
All observations are positive and statistically insignificant, which confirms the rejection 
for Hypothesis 6.  
Figure 5: Interaction Effects of Balanced Entrepreneur and Female Gender after Logit 
Regression 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Research on leadership emergence has offered useful insights into how an 
individual’s capability is perceived by others and contributes to acquire high status within 
a group. Extant literature has suggested that group members determine who is best suited 
to engage in leadership through a prototype-driven comparison process (Wellman, 2017). 
Specifically, scholars associated leadership emergence with each group’s prototype of the 
ideal leader and proposed that when members of the group perceive an individual as 
having more of the same characteristics as the prototype, he or she is more likely to be 
seen as a leader (Wellman, 2017). While leadership emergence literature provides a 
meaningful answer to the question of why some people emerge as leaders and others do 
not, it does not fully address differences in team contexts, which can greatly influence 
how a group envisions the team prototype.  
To advance our understanding of leadership emergence in the team and the social 
entrepreneurship context, I suggest hypotheses related to when an individual within a 
founding team becomes the first CEO of a social venture. Following the premise of 
extant literature, I assume that a team member whose characteristics mostly overlap with 
the ideal leader prototype in social entrepreneurship is most likely to become the first 
CEO. Drawing upon human capital theory and expectancy violation theory, I propose that 
task-relevant human capital—prior commercial experience and prior social experience—
and a founder’s gender may work as critical cues of leader attributes. Based on 
configurations of human capital and gender, the likelihood of a founder becoming the 
CEO would diverge. 
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Results showed that the most important human capital element to become a leader 
in a social venture is prior social experience; the role of commercial experience and 
balanced background were not salient. It shows that even for hybrid or for-profit social 
ventures with a goal of profit generation, founding team members tend to consider social 
sector experience as a crucial factor to become a leader. This could be due to the social 
venture’s need to enhance the legitimacy in its early-stage. As Dees (1998) mentioned, 
the most essential element of the social venture is its social mission. To enhance the 
legitimacy as an organization with a primary social goal, social venture founding teams 
might want to choose a leader who can strengthen the venture’s identity as a social 
mission-oriented organization and can expound the organization’s social goal.  
Additionally, consistent with the expectancy violation theory, findings show that 
female founders’ commercial experience amplify her probability of becoming the CEO. 
On the other hand, male founders’ social experiences do not have any influence on the 
probability of becoming the CEO. This finding indicates that positive violation of gender 
stereotypes helps only female founders to emerge as leaders in social ventures, while do 
not help male founders. I believe the results of this paper provide rich opportunities for 
the future research.  
Theoretical Implications 
 
The current research makes theoretical contributions to the literature on social 
entrepreneurship and leadership emergence by offering a framework to comprehend the 
first CEO assignment of social ventures. First, this study extends human capital theory by 
suggesting that the specific human capital of social entrepreneurs is related to chances of 
becoming the CEO in the early-stage of a social venture. To best address the social 
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venture’s goal, the ideal leader must manage the different needs of stakeholders and 
maintain the delicate balance between the social and financial goal (Lumpkin et al., 
2013). Although social ventures need to apply business models to serve a social mission, 
previous work experiences accrued from the social sector turned out to be the most 
crucial factor for becoming the first CEO. The finding also indicates that social 
experience of a core founder is even much important than having work experiences in 
both commercial firms and social mission-oriented organizations. It implies that in the 
early stage, social ventures tend to concentrate on identifying and solidifying their social 
mission rather than improving their capability for profit generation or fundraising.  
This study also contributes to the gender in entrepreneurship literature by 
suggesting that leadership over-emergence of a specific gender does not occur in the 
social entrepreneurship context. Entrepreneurship literature has shown that female 
entrepreneurs tend to encounter more difficulties in acquiring access to external financial 
resources because investors are more likely to associate the physical characteristics of 
female entrepreneurs with their level of general capability as compared with their male 
counterparts (Brooks et al., 2014; Buttner & Rosen, 1989; Fuller-Love et al., 2006). Due 
to this tendency, leadership positions in entrepreneurial organizations are typically 
dominated by men. The current study shows that this tendency differs in social 
entrepreneurship. Results indicate women entrepreneurs’ commercial experience is 
valued as appropriate quality as leaders by social venture founding teams, while men 
entrepreneurs’ commercial experience is not. This aligns with prior argument from 
literature: the impact of gender on outcomes is context-specific and varies depending on 
valued qualities in a specific environment (Eagly & Karau, 1991; Ridgeway, 2001).   
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 Practical Implications 
 
This study has managerial implications for social entrepreneurs who compete for 
the CEO position now or in future. By looking at the first CEO selection in social 
ventures, this study identifies and explores the type of human capital that contributes to 
the first CEO appointment. The finding shows that the social experience of a founding 
team member has a significant impact on becoming the CEO, which implies that 
acquiring legitimacy in the area is the most crucial task for early-stage social ventures. It 
also indicates that initial social ventures are primarily oriented towards social mission in 
general rather than making the balance between social mission and profit generation. 
Furthermore, only for female founding team members, previous working experiences in 
the commercial sector can enhance her possibility of becoming the CEO. Social venture 
founding teams tend to positively assess the commercial background of female team 
members and view it as a leadership quality. This result has implications in particular for 
female social entrepreneurs who strive for the leadership position within early-stage 
social ventures. 
Limitations and Future Research  
 
In this study, I only focus on leadership emergence, the first strategic decision that 
founding team members need to make in the social venture’s early stage. Future research 
can extend the current study by investigating the long-term effect of the first CEO’s 
dominant background on social ventures’ decision-making pattern, survival rate, and 
performance in fundraising and economic sustainability. Specifically, it might be 
interesting and meaningful to examine how ventures led by CEOs with commercial 
backgrounds differs from a venture led by CEOs with social backgrounds. Due to social 
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ventures’ dualistic nature, the first CEO’s background may largely affect the 
organization’s orientation towards commercial activities and social mission, and it will 
have a lasting impact on the firms’ future performance. Scholars have recognized that 
organizations differ from one another because of social imprinting  (Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Johnson, 2007). According to social imprinting perspective, organizations differ from 
each other because they are shaped by economic, technological, and cultural resources 
that their founders drew from the founding context. These resources exercise a lasting 
influence on a wide variety of organizational features, including managerial structure, 
organizational network, and survival rate (Johnson, 2007). Social imprinting arguments 
can offer a profound theoretical framework to explore this phenomenon. 
While the data of this study was directly collected from social entrepreneurs’ 
background and motivation, I was unable to assess the decision-making process of social 
venture founding teams directly. Thus, scholars can take a more proximal approach to 
assessing founding team members’ decision-making pattern, such as scenario analysis 
and computer simulation (Kish-gephart & Campbell, 2015). Early-stage social ventures at 
incubators might be relatively accessible to reach than already established social 
ventures.  
Another limitation of this study is its concentration on only for-profit and hybrid 
ventures and mixed-gender founding teams, which bounds generalizability of the finding. 
The data for this study excluded entrepreneurs in nonprofit social ventures or single-
gender founding teams to focus on the leadership emergence in organizations with dual 
social and financial purpose in association with the gender of team members. I believe 
exploring the CEO selection patter using a different type of data from this study would 
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allow researchers to create richer theoretical and empirical implications for leadership 
emergence and entrepreneurship literature. Specifically, a focus of nonprofit social 
ventures in their leader selection would be different from that of for-profit/hybrid social 
ventures. Further, expectedly, all-women founding teams and all-men founding teams 
might engage in different cognitive evaluations in their leader selection from mix-gender 
teams.      
This study assumes that a social entrepreneur’s personal experience with the focal 
social problem may affect a social venture’s decision-making pattern, thus in the analysis 
I controlled for it. For a future research endeavor, scholars can explore the founding 
motivation of social entrepreneurs and its influence on organizational outcomes. The role 
of entrepreneurial motivation in entrepreneurial processes and outcomes has been widely 
explored in traditional entrepreneurship studies, but the long-term effect of social 
entrepreneurs’ motivation is less commonly studied (Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003). For 
years, a few social entrepreneurship scholars have explored the question of why social 
entrepreneurs seek to create social ventures. However, most work has focused on either 
how intentions of engaging in social ventures are formed (Mair & Martí, 2006) or the 
differences among social entrepreneurs in their fundamental reasons to initiate social 
entrepreneurship activities (Robinson, 2006). Social entrepreneurship is much more 
problem-solving focused than traditional ventures, thus how a social entrepreneur is 
related to the focal social problem can largely explain the social ventures’ entrepreneurial 
process and performance (Yitshaki & Kropp, 2016). Future research can further delve 
into this concept by taking the micro-foundations approach. For instance, scholars can 
examine how a social entrepreneur’s founding motivation related to the social problem 
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would affect a social venture’s strategic choice, future performance, and survival rate. 
Additionally, future research can consider how the specific personal experience of a 
social entrepreneur can enrich the power of narratives. Narratives that well-describe 
social entrepreneurs’ founding motivation can improve external resource providers’ 
evaluations on the social ventures’ legitimacy and authenticity towards the social mission 
(Yitshaki & Kropp, 2016).  
CONCLUSION 
 
Leadership emergence literature suggests that team members with characteristics 
consistent with the general leadership prototype are likely to emerge as leaders due to 
perceptual congruence (Neubert & Taggar, 2004; Wellman, 2017) . Drawing on human 
capital theory and expectancy violation theory, this study investigates the first CEO 
emergence occurring in early-stage social ventures, where members of groups determine 
who might be best suited as leader. By focusing on the characteristics of core founders 
and the situations of core founders becoming the first CEO, this study highlights unique 
aspects of leadership emergence in social ventures that simultaneously pursue social 
mission and commercial goal. When core founders had previously worked at social 
sectors, they were most likely to be perceived as leaders because their prior work 
experiences made group members perceive them as capable of serving the social mission.  
Additionally, women entrepreneurs’ commercial experience is much favorably 
considered than men entrepreneurs’ commercial experience in the first CEO selection. 
Overall, findings demonstrate that early-stage social venture founding teams are unique 
in their first leader selection, and it is strongly associated with distinctive characteristics 
of social entrepreneurship. 
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CHAPTER 4: ECHOING GREEN’S SURVIVAL STRATEGY AFTER 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 2008 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, a number of fellowship programs support social entrepreneurship. These 
fellowship programs offered by foundations provide a great deal of approachable 
opportunities to early-stage organizations that primarily support social mission. 
Foundations provide their fellows with seed capital to launch organizations that address 
their innovative ideas and help social entrepreneurs develop skills needed to be leaders in 
social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurs who were selected as fellows of foundations 
tend to show high survival rate. For instance, an evaluation study conducted by Ashoka in 
2002 of 1997 fellows showed that 94% were survived after 5 years of successful 
operation. Further, 70% of Echoing Green-funded organizations from 1990-2015 are still 
in 2018. Overall, fellowship foundations contribute to the growth of social 
entrepreneurship by selecting and supporting promising talents with innovative ideas to 
tackle social problems. 
Fellowship foundations are largely affected by economic fluctuations. One of 
primary macroeconomic challenges that most organizations went through was the recent 
global financial crisis in 2008. Financial crisis in 2008 leads to severe budget limitations 
for many nonprofit organizations due to less financial support from individual donators 
and governments (Peterson & Su, 2017; Strom, 2009; Watkins, 2009). This hardship is 
further exacerbated for charitable organizations as the economic downturn creates more 
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demands for their services (Peterson & Su, 2017). It also resulted in tremendous change 
in fellowship foundations for social entrepreneurs, specifically in foundations’ overall 
strategic decisions. These consequential changes include the foundation’s way of 
financing, the choice of creating partnership, the composition of the board, and the 
allocation of the foundation’s fellowship. In this paper, I explore how fellowship 
foundations responded to the increased call for funding and the diminishing financial 
sources after the downturn in the U.S. economy, by exploring a prominent fellowship 
foundation for early-stage social entrepreneurs, Echoing Green. 
By investigating Echoing Green’s strategic decisions in response to the financial 
crisis in 2008, the current paper aims to discuss the results and implications of the 
foundation’s choices and provide knowledge on the effect of financial adversity to 
organizations in the area of social entrepreneurship. Specifically, I investigate strategic 
actions that Echoing Green foundation took in response to challenges derived from its 
financial challenges during the economic downturn in 2008. Echoing Green is a nonprofit 
public charity that selects Echoing Green Fellows and provides those Fellows with seed 
capital and non-financial support to help them succeed with their ventures (Battilana, 
DeLong, & Weber, 2009).  Echoing Green Fellows are social entrepreneurs—individuals 
who found and manage organizations aimed at solving social problems. Echoing Green 
Fellows have been implementing new ideas to address an environmental, economic, 
social, or political inequity problem (Battilana et al., 2009). Echoing Green had funded 
leading organizations in social entrepreneurship such as City Year and Teach for America 
in the United States, African Leadership Academy in Africa, and SKS Microfinance in 
Asia. In general, funding consisted of a two-year stipend that ranged from $30,000 to 
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$45,000 per year, per organization in 2008 (Battilana et al., 2009; Battilana, DeLong, & 
Weber, 2015). Strategic supports include leadership development, training, conferences, 
and networking opportunities designed to facilitate Fellows’ success (Battilana et al., 
2015). As Echoing Green was heavily backing young entrepreneurs who just graduated 
college or graduate school, strategic supports were especially crucial to help 
entrepreneurs create genuine social impact.     
In late 2008, many Echoing Green’s supporters reduced or deferred their 
donations due to the economic downturn. However, despite this adversity in 2008, 
Echoing Green was relatively successful in the field. It kept raising more money, 
selecting more fellows, and developing a new program. However, Echoing Green was 
facing another challenge—increased competition in the field. Echoing Green had been a 
lone pioneer in the field of social entrepreneurship for over 20 years. However, at that 
time it was on the verge of losing its leadership position as a number of organizations 
with similar missions and more resources come to the field, including Ashoka and the 
Skoll Foundation. From inside and outside, Echoing Green was facing a strong need to 
transform.  
 In this article, I examine Echoing Greens’ strategic actions after the financial 
crisis 2008. In response to increasing demand of its services and competition in the field 
of social entrepreneurship, Echoing Green creates a number of partnerships to expand its 
program and focus. Echoing Green’s strategic responses to the complicated internal and 
external challenges have an important implication for public charity and private 
foundations aimed at support social entrepreneurs.  
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Table 3: Summary of Financial Data ($, except the number of donors and public 
support percentage; fiscal year ends June 30 of the year indicated) 
 
Source: Echoing Green Form 990 (2008-2016). 
                                                 
1 Represents the number of donors who contributed $5,000 or more in that year. 
2 A 501(c)(3) organization is treated as a public charity for its current year and the next taxable year if, over 
five-year measuring period, one-third or more of its total support is public support from governmental 
agencies and qualifying contribution or grants from the general public and other public charities. (Source: 
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/public-support-tests-part-i-509a1/) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 
revenue 
4,261,335 5,544,407 3,568,391 5,582,121 8,438,807 18,507,751 9,000,301 6,751,613 6,153,472 
Received 
contributions 
4,214,870 5,512,455 3,502,438 4,921,009 7,602,156 17,872,933 8,653,858 6,595,633 6,053,339 
Grants paid 1,205,854 1,386,208 1,334,251 2,657,036 2,719,351 3,944,099 4,160,060 4,179,374 3,321,048 
Other 
expenses 
221,836 1,069,771 1,065,094 1,503,002 1,679,516 2,061,580 3,320,129 2,900,182 2,871,693 
Total 
expenses 
3,286,334 3,576,391 3,752,192 6,028,990 6,633,853 9,119,916 11,275,877 10,924,236 9,814,028 
Excess 
revenues 
over 
expenses 
975,001 1,968,016 (183,801) (446,869) 1,804,954 9,387,835 (2,275,465) (4,172,623) (3,660,556) 
Total assets  3,913,315 5,844,543 5,784,569 6,329,026 8,465,263 19,215,897 17,728,888 12,575,722 9,138,988 
Number of 
donors1 
87 n/a 90 94 n/a 106 n/a n/a n/a 
Public 
support 
percentage2 
n/a 55.20% 55.09% 57.13% 57.23% 51.12% 55.76% 60.08% 62.58% 
85 
 
ECHOING GREEN’S EARLY HISTORY 
 
Echoing Green is a New York City-based fellowship organization that seeks the 
improvement of society by identifying and supporting social entrepreneurs who launched 
entrepreneurial organizations to tap into societal problems. Echoing Green selects fellows 
with great talents and ideas to solve the world’s problems, supports fellows to enhance 
their odds of success, and attract donors by using fellows’ stories of success to continue 
backing social entrepreneurs.  
Echoing Green was established in 1987, in order to increase social impact by 
using venture capital investment model. Its roots can be found the philanthropic activities 
of Charles Feeney, a businessman and philanthropist and the founder of General Atlantic 
and Atlantic Philanthropies. In 1960, Feeney co-founded Duty-Free Shoppers Group 
(DFS), which pioneered the concept of duty-free shopping. Over several decades, he 
developed and managed the highly profitable business and created a tremendous wealth. 
However, he is known for his frugality, and enjoyed giving money away in secret. In 
1982, Feeney created the Atlantic Philanthropies and also found General Atlantic as a 
private investment company to manage the assets of Atlantic Philanthropies (Battilana et 
al, 2015). General Atlantic hired Edward Cohen as the CEO.  
In 1987, General Atlantic helped launch Echoing Green to generate a positive 
social impact by assisting young social entrepreneurs to start their ventures and solve the 
social problem. Cohen and professionals from General Atlantic evaluated candidates for 
Echoing Green Fellows as if they were evaluating a potential investment (Battilana et al., 
2015). Over the 20 years, two major funding sources of Echoing Green had been General 
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Atlantic and Atlantic Philanthropies. Cohen was often identified with Echoing Green and 
called as the early guiding force of the organization. After Cohen retired in 1995, 
Echoing Green was significantly suffered from his absence. The number of Fellows kept 
decreasing, and officers left the organization. In 2001, Echoing Green only supported five 
Fellows.  
Obviously, Echoing Green was struggling to survive. Furthermore, in 2001, 
General Atlantic notified Echoing Green that it cannot continue supporting the 
organization anymore. At that point, Echoing Green hired Cheryl Dorsey, a previous 
Echoing Green Fellow in 1992 as the new president who will lead to transform the 
organization to survive. When Cheryl Dorsey was named as the president, there was 
almost nothing but great records of Echoing Green Fellows. In mid-2001, Echoing Green 
just had two full-time employees, and the organization was facing so much uncertainty 
around the future of the organization. Since Dorsey was named as the new president of 
Echoing Green in 2001, she has focused on developing a base of donors and 
reconstructing the organization almost from scratch (Battilana et al., 2015). To enhance 
the organization’s strategic focus and sustainability, Dorsey brought in consultants who 
can help her to examine Echoing Greens’ strategic options. In late 2006, Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) outlined several options for Echoing Green. These options 
include 1) Stay the course, do not make any significant changes, 2) Grow the existing 
program—more fellows, potentially larger or longer funding from Fellows, more 
coaching and support of fellows, 3) Develop new programs (Battilana et al., 2015). 
Following their last two suggestions, Echoing Green expanded its focus on young fellows 
by launching new fellowship program called “Be Bold Initiative” in late 2006, which 
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intended to inspire more young people to seek meaningful career in social sector. 
Furthermore, Echoing Green increased the number of fellows and prepared itself for 
developing new fellowship programs.  
Over next six years, Dorsey built a more self-supporting organization (Battilana et 
al., 2015) and developed Echoing Green as global Fellowship program almost from 
scratch. Thanks to her leadership, Echoing Green could enhance its influence in the field 
of social entrepreneurship, and create a wide network of donors to support their 
philanthropic activities.  
Table 4. History of Echoing Green  
Year Event 
1987 • Leadership of General Atlantic launches Echoing Green to maximize its 
philanthropic impact.  
• Edward Cohen, the CEO of General Atlantic serves as Echoing Green’s 
chairman.  
1991 • Echoing Green invests in Vanessa Kirsch, Founder of Public Allies, and later 
provides support to Michelle Obama to run the Chicago office of Public Allies. 
1995 • Edward Cohen retires in 1995, the number of Fellows selected each year began to 
fall.  
1996 • Fellow Sara Horowitz launches Working Today (now the Freelancers Union)—a 
first of its kind national membership organization that offers benefits to freelancer 
workers. The for-profit subsidiary, Freelancers Insurance Company, received a 
$340 million government grant in 2012 to establish nonprofit insurance 
companies in three states. 
2001 • Only five Fellows are selected in 2001. 
• Atlantic Philanthropies, one of the two major funding sources of Echoing Green, 
notifies that it would not continue to support Echoing Green.  
• 1992 Echoing Green Fellow Cheryl Dorsey becomes president of Echoing Green, 
reshaping the organization into a global nonprofit. 
2007 • Felix Brandon Lloyd, Founder of Skill-Life, is the first Fellow to apply with a for-
profit business model. Over the next five years, Echoing Green’s Fellowship 
portfolio averages 38% for-profit and hybrid business models. 
2009 • Cheryl Dorsey and other notable Fellows serve on The Obama-Biden Presidential 
Transition team and assist in standing up the first ever White House Office of 
Social Innovation and Civic Participation. 
2010 • SKS Microfinance, founded by 1998 Fellow Vikram Akula, becomes the largest 
micro-lending company to go public in an IPO that raises over $350 million. 
2011 • Echoing Green creates a partnership with Barclays.  
• Ajay Nagpal, Managing Director at Barclays capital joins the board. 
• Echoing Green publishes Work on Purpose and launches a corresponding 
program to help young people build careers that are right for them and good for 
the world. 
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2012 • Echoing Green creates a partnership with the Open Society Foundation. 
• In partnership with the Open Society Foundation, Echoing Green launches the 
Black Male Achievement Fellowship, selecting nine Fellows that are improving 
the life of black men and boys in the U.S. 
• Robb Vorhoff, Managing Director at General Atlantics joins the board. 
• Echoing Green co-authors “In Search of the Hybrid ideal” for the Stanford Social 
Innovation Review and initiates a partnership with The Social Entrepreneurs 
Fund, a multi-million dollars fund that supports Echoing Green’s for-profit 
Fellows. 
2013 • Echoing Green creates a partnership with Newman’s Own Foundation. 
2014 • Echoing Green creates a partnership with the Zoom Foundation. 
• In partnership with the Zoom Foundation, Echoing Green launches the Climate 
Fellowship, which is specifically targeted for next-generation social entrepreneurs 
committed to working on innovations in mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change. 
• Echoing Green launches Inflection Cohorts to support Fellows facing key 
opportunities to grow their organizations past their initial Fellowship.  
 
Source: Adapted from Annual Reports (2010-2017) and 25th anniversary and highlights achievements 
(2012). 
  
STRATEGIC CHANGES AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: FROM A SINGLE 
PROGRAM TO A PLATFORM 
 
For the first time in 2007, Echoing Green selected a fellow relies on a for-profit 
business model. Since then, the ratio of Echoing Green fellows fall back on for-
profit/hybrid models are continuously increasing. Additionally, after the financial crisis in 
2008, social entrepreneurs began to seriously consider the way of generating revenues 
that can sustain their operations and engage in commercial activities to continuously 
pursue a social mission. The number of applications from these types of social ventures 
was continuously increasing. For instance, in 2006, only 37% of applicants of Echoing 
Green relied on for-profit/hybrid models, while in 2010, almost 50% relied on it. To call 
the need of economically sustainable business model for social entrepreneurship, Echoing 
Green announced that it will actively support for-profit/hybrid social ventures. From 
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2007, the ratio of for-profit/hybrid social ventures got the support from Echoing Green is 
continuously increasing (See Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Echoing Green Fellows’ Organization Model (2008-2017) 
 
Note. The first Fellow to apply with a for-profit business model was selected in 2007.  
 
Additionally, Echoing Green launched additional fellowship programs in 
partnership with other philanthropic foundations. It reflects the President Cheryl Dorsey’s 
willingness to shift Echoing Green’s strategy from one focused on a single program to a 
platform strategy that operated programs in many different areas (Battilana et al., 2015). 
In 2011, Echoing Green began working with The Social Entrepreneurs Fund (TSEF) in 
order to offer some of for-profit organizations recoverable grants, a form of convertible 
note that the organization require to repay the grant to TSEF when they become 
financially successful (Battilana, DeLong, and Weber, 2015). TSEF also provided 
additional follow-up capital for social entrepreneurs if they need it. In the same year, the 
ratio of for-profit/hybrid Fellows exceeds that of nonprofit Fellows. Among the entire 
Fellows, 58% of social ventures were engaging in economic activities for profit 
generation at least to some extent.  
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Figure 7. Number of Fellows Selected by Year and Organization Model 
 
Source: Echoing Green website (www.echoinggreen.org) 
 
Figure 8. GDP growth of the United States from 2008-2017 
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In 2012, Echoing Green formed a partnership with the Open Society Foundations 
in order to launch a new fellowship program called the Black Male Achievement (BMA) 
Fellowship. The Open Society Foundations is founded by George Soros in 1979, for 
originally supporting scholarships for black students at the University of Cape Town in 
South African and for Eastern European dissidents to study abroad. In 1996, the 
foundations launched programs in the United States, which focused on eradicating the 
root causes of poverty and injustice. The foundations have been promoting democratic 
governance and protecting the rights of minorities, and civil and political liberties. For 
the BMA Fellowship, the Open society foundations provided the funding and Echoing 
Green managed the program. The BMA fellows have diverse backgrounds, experience, 
and identities but share a common vision of addressing the most engrained problems 
facing black men and boys. Nine fellows were selected as the first BMA fellows in 2012, 
and most of them took nonprofit business model. As a result, the ratio of fellows relied on 
nonprofit model exceeds those relied on for-profit/hybrid model in 2012.   
In 2013, Echoing Green created a partnership with Newman’s Own Foundation. 
Newman’s Own Foundation is a private foundation founded in in 2005 by Paul Newman, 
an actor and one of co-founder of Newman’s Own, to sustain his philanthropic legacy. 
Echoing Green Fellows in 2013 are supported by Newman’s Own Foundation through a 
partnership with Echoing Green. Newman’s Own Foundation had been one of major 
donors of Echoing Green in 2013 and 2014.  
Additionally, Echoing Green launched a new fellowship program called the 
Climate Fellowship in partnership with the ZOOM Foundation in 2014. The ZOOM 
Foundation is a private foundation that focuses its investments on innovative efforts that 
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have high potential for sustainable and substantial social impact. The foundation 
concentrates its funding on projects in the areas of education and environment. The new 
Climate Fellowship is specifically targeted for next-generation social entrepreneurs 
working on innovations in mitigation and adaptation to climate change. In 2014, twelve 
social entrepreneurs are named as the first Climate Fellows. From 2014 to 2018, sixty-six 
Fellows committed to mitigate and adapt to climate changes are supported by Echoing 
Green.  
Now in 2018, Echoing Green is operating three Fellowships: Global Fellowship, 
Black Male Achievement Fellowship, and Climate Fellowship. Global Fellowship has the 
longest history and is open to any social entrepreneurs with innovative ideas to tackle the 
social problem for any issue. Black Male Achievement Fellowship is given to leaders 
committed to improving the life of black men in the United States. Lastly, Climate 
Fellowship is for leaders with innovative ideas to face climate change.  
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Table 5. Major Donators (Represents donors who contributed $500,000 or more in 
that fiscal year) 
 
 
Source: Echoing Green Annual Reports (2010-2017). 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
Barclays Barclays David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
Barclays 
General 
Atlantic 
General 
Atlantic 
General 
Atlantic 
General 
Atlantic 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
General 
Atlantic 
David C. 
and Laurie 
B. 
Hodgson 
Pershing 
Square 
Foundation 
Pershing 
Square 
Foundation 
Open 
Society 
Foundation 
Newman’s 
Own 
Foundation 
General 
Atlantic 
General 
Atlantic 
JLGreene General 
Atlantic 
W.K. 
Kellogg 
Foundation 
W.K. 
Kellogg 
Foundation 
Pershing 
Square 
Foundation 
Open 
Society 
Foundation 
Irene 
Diamond 
Fund 
JLGreene Open 
Society 
Foundation 
JLGreene 
  W.K. 
Kellogg 
Foundation 
Pershing 
Square 
Foundation 
JLGreene Open 
Society 
Foundation 
Steve and 
Roberta 
Denning 
Steve and 
Roberta 
Denning 
    Newman’s 
Own 
Foundation 
Steve and 
Roberta 
Denning 
USAID Zoom 
Foundation 
    Open 
Society 
Foundation 
USAID Walton 
Family 
Foundation 
 
    Pershing 
Square 
Foundation 
Walton 
Family 
Foundation 
Zoom 
Foundation 
 
    USAID Zoom 
Foundation 
  
    Zoom 
Foundation 
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CHANGES OF BOARD COMPOSITION 
 
As the number of partnerships increases, the size of Echoing Green board grows. 
In 2008, it has seventeen board members, while in 2018 it has twenty four members. 
David C. Hodgson from General Atlantic has been a Chairman since 2008, and Maya 
Ajmera, a former Echoing Green Fellow in 1993, became the vice chair in 2010. In 2014, 
she became the Co-Chair of the board. Echoing Green Fellows had not attended the board 
except Ajmera and the president Cheryl Dorsey, but recently two former Fellows, Rafiq 
Kalam Id-Din at Ember Charter Schools and Raj Panjabi at Last Mile Heath became new 
board members. Currently in 2018, Echoing Green has four board member who are 
former Echoing Green Fellows. Among twenty four members in 2016, nine serve as 
board members since 2008.   
In 2008, the board was balanced in terms of board members’ backgrounds. 
Among fifteen members, eight members were from social sector, while nine members 
were from commercial sector, particularly investment banking. However, after the 
economic downturn in 2008, new members joined the board were heavily from financial 
sectors. From 2008 to 2013, Echoing Green brought six new board members from 
financial institutions, including Ajay Nagpal at Barclays in 2011. During that time, the 
only new board member with non-financial background was Joshua Mailman at Social 
Venture Network in 2013. To enhance the base of donors and create partnerships with 
other foundations, Echoing Green increased the size of the board, and brought in people 
at financial institutions. From 2010 to 2013, Echoing Green board was dominated by 
directors from financial institutions. 
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However, in 2016, three new board members with social sector background 
attended the board. Rafiq Kalam Id-Din and Raj Panjabi are former Echoing Green 
Fellows in 2007 and 2011 accordingly, and Peggy Segal is program director of Hunter 
College in New York. Seemingly, Echoing Green strive for balancing the background of 
board members after its financial situations became relatively stable in 2016.  
Surprisingly, when most of board members were from financial institutions, 
Echoing Green supported more nonprofit social ventures over for-profit/hybrid ventures, 
except in the year of 2011. On the other hand, after new members with social sector 
background came to the board, the ratio of Fellows relying on for-profit/hybrid model 
became exceed that of Fellows relying on nonprofit model. It could be partially 
interpreted as being consistent with the motives for corporate giving (Peterson & Su, 
2017) that had been largely examined in organization literature. Research on corporate 
philanthropy suggested that foundations sponsored by industrial-oriented firms tend to 
make charitable giving decisions more from an altruistic purpose, while foundations 
sponsored by consumer-oriented firms has marketing-related objective to increase sales 
through philanthropy (Peterson & Su, 2017). Expectedly, the primary goal of financial 
institutions might improve their public image by engaging in philanthropy, rather than 
increase its sales or financial performance. Like industrial-oriented firms, thus, board of 
directors represent financial institutions would put much emphasis on charitable purpose 
of giving. This argument is based on the observation of just one case but opens an 
interesting research question that future research can investigate.   
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CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS OF FELLOWS 
 
 The chart represents the number of Echoing Green Fellows on yearly basis shows 
similar pattern with that of the GDP growth rate of the United States (Figure 2-1, Figure 
2-2). During the economic downturn in 2008-2009, the GDP growth rate and the number 
of Echoing Green Fellows show similar trajectory. Additionally, when the GDP growth 
rate increased in 2014, the number of Fellows also increased. While, when the GDP 
growth rate decreased in 2016, the number of Fellows selected were also decreased, and 
in 2017, both of them increased again. These graphs look largely different in 2010 and 
2011, when the GDP growth rate highly increased while the number of Fellows were still 
low. It might indicate that there exists a time lag between the improvement of macro-
economic conditions and that of Fellowship foundations’ charitable giving. Echoing 
Green has been slowly increasing the number of Fellows after the economic downturn in 
2008-2009.   
 Echoing Green supports social entrepreneurs with innovative ideas to solve social 
problems in the area of arts & culture, civil & human rights, education, environment, 
food & agriculture, health & healthcare, poverty alleviation & economic development, 
and public service & civic engagement. Fellows were mainly operated in education, 
environment, and poverty alleviation & economic development. The number of Fellows 
in environment and poverty alleviation has continually increased, while that in education 
showed the same pattern until 2015 and significant decreased in 2016 and 2017. The 
number of Fellows in environment highly increased after 2014, when the Climate 
Fellowship was launched. The number of Fellows aiming to alleviate poverty or develop 
economic situation was the highest in 2008, while it significantly fell down in 2009, 
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assumingly due to the influence of the financial crisis. However, after 2009, the number 
increased again. 
Figure 10. Issue Areas of Echoing Green Fellows by Year 
 
 
 
0
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8
10
12
14
16
18
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Arts & Culture 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0
Civil & Human Rights 11 4 4 5 3 4 5 8 6 2 6
Education 9 4 2 5 4 10 14 13 16 3 2
Environment 4 5 0 3 4 5 3 9 12 11 13
Food & Agriculture 0 1 4 5 2 5 0 5 4 3 3
Health & Healthcare 4 9 6 7 7 3 6 7 5 2 1
Poverty Alleviation & Economic Development 6 13 3 5 6 9 8 11 8 10 11
Public Service & Civic Engagement 0 2 6 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 2
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IMPLICATIONS OF ECHOING GREEN’S STRATEGIC CHOICE 
 
To overcome the financial adversity in 2008, Echoing Green took two major 
strategic decisions. 1) Building a base of donors by selecting new board members at 
financial institutions. 2) Creating a partnership with private foundations and 
cooperatively launch and support fellowship programs. By implementing these strategies, 
the President Cheryl Dorsey can enhance the finances of the foundation and achieve the 
vision she had about the fellowship platform. Additionally, Echoing Green continuously 
provides increasing supports to social entrepreneurs rely on for-profit/hybrid model. It 
has been emphasizing the importance of sustainability for social ventures.  
However, some people in philanthropy have raised concerns about the recent 
tendency of fellowship foundations highlighting for-profit/hybrid model and using 
venture-capitalist approach to select social ventures to support. They argued that 
foundations for social entrepreneurship do not provide resources to people who really 
need the resources, especially those who were eliminated from opportunities to get the 
college education. For instance, most of Echoing Green Fellows were young college 
graduates, and a number of them had a chance to attend the social entrepreneur 
incubating program in their Universities, specifically designed for developing skills and 
knowledge about the social entrepreneurship. As a result, they know how to frame their 
work look innovative, how to use appropriate language in the application, and how to do 
better presentation. Therefore, they can have better chance of getting funding than people 
in arduous situations who desperately need resources to improve their living conditions.   
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For thirty years, Echoing Green had supported more than 763 social change 
leaders working in 86 countries, directly invested $42.5 million in their development, and 
created substantial and sustainable social changes. Echoing Green Fellows had been 
widely successful so far, but there is still a remaining question. One of board members of 
Echoing Green once asked, “Whether we were really making our fellows successful, or 
were we simply picking great fellows who will be successful with or without them? 
(Battilana et al., 2009).”  Fellowship foundations need to be better supporting social 
entrepreneurs from all backgrounds to more effectively create meaningful social changes.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide useful insights to understand early-stage 
social ventures’ resource acquisition and the first CEO selection, and the survival strategy 
of funding organizations for early-stage social ventures. Drawing upon insights from 
signaling theory and team diversity literature, the proposed framework in Chapter 2 
describes factors that affect impact investors’ investment decisions, and how these factors 
are created during the formation of social ventures. In doing so, the framework explicates 
the criteria VPFs tend to rely on when they select social ventures to support. 
Additionally, it highlights a social entrepreneur’s personal experience related to the 
motivation of starting a social venture as a crucial resource of an early-stage social 
venture, which can indirectly affect the funding success rate in the early stage. The 
proposed model has particular implications for social entrepreneurs who are in a nascent 
stage of organizational development and aim to acquire financial resources and strategic 
support from impact investors. Suggestions for this research can contribute to early-stage 
social ventures’ chance to succeed in VPFs funding.  
The empirical study in Chapter 3 investigates the first CEO selection in early-
stage social ventures, where members of groups determine who might be best suited as 
the first CEO. Findings show that the first CEO selection in this context differs from that 
in another entrepreneurship context. It indicates that distinctive characteristics of social 
ventures from other organizations contribute to the unique leadership emergence pattern 
in early-stage social ventures. Specifically, when core founders had previously worked in 
social sectors, they were most likely to be perceived as leaders. Additionally, women 
entrepreneurs’ commercial experience is much favorably considered than men 
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entrepreneurs’ commercial experience in the first CEO selection. By looking into how 
leadership emerges in early-stage social venture context, it provides implications for 
scholars interested in leadership emergence or CEO selection in the entrepreneurship 
context. Additionally, it might be of interest to early-stage social entrepreneurs who 
compete for the first CEO position. Findings of this chapter also have implications for 
funding organizations that aim to create concrete social changes by supporting social 
entrepreneurs with capability and credibility. 
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the survival strategy of the Echoing Green 
Foundation, one of the prominent impact investors that primarily support social ventures 
in a nascent stage. To overcome the challenge emerged from the financial crisis in 2008, 
the Echoing Green foundation create many partnerships to improve its economic status 
and successfully transform itself from a single funding program to a platform which 
supports a variety of social mission. These strategic decisions lead to significant changes 
in its board construction and thus have an impact on the type of social ventures that the 
Echoing Green mainly supports. The Echoing Green’s story offers valuable implications 
for public charities, and private foundations aim to support social entrepreneurship.  
While the proposed models and stories in this dissertation offer useful insights to 
understand decision makings of early-stage social ventures and impact investors, there is 
still room for improvement. One limitation of this dissertation is its concentration on only 
for-profit and hybrid ventures, which bounds the generalizability of findings. I believe 
exploring the proposed model using a different dataset would contribute to the literature 
by adding richer implications. For instance, nonprofit social ventures can show a different 
pattern in their leader selection and resource acquisition from for-profit or hybrid social 
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ventures. Furthermore, this dissertation suggests a social entrepreneur’s personal 
experience that facilitates founding motivation as an important resource for early-stage 
social ventures yet does not dig into enough to figure out how does this affect the social 
entrepreneur’s decision-making pattern and outcomes of social venture. For years, some 
social entrepreneurship scholars have tapped into this topic, but the long-term effect of 
social entrepreneurs’ personal experience with the social problem is not widely studied so 
far. I believe future research can create a significant contribution to social 
entrepreneurship literature by further delving into this concept by taking many different 
approaches.  
In this dissertation, I intend to extend the literature on early-stage social ventures 
and impact investors. Overall, findings suggest that social ventures, especially in its 
early-stage, provide a unique context to investigate organizational topics, and their 
distinctive characteristics mainly affect resource acquisition and the CEO selection. It 
indicates promising future research opportunities for scholars in the field of social 
entrepreneurship. I also believe that policymakers and practitioners will benefit 
significantly from additional research examining social entrepreneurship.         
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Core founder, other founders, CEO 
- Definition: A core founder is an individual who comes up with the idea of creating 
the organization and suggests the earliest outline of the venture (Wasserman, 
2012; 2017). In some cases, the core founder can be more than one person.  
- Non-core founders are the ones who joined the core founder as part of the team. 
- The CEO is a member of the founding team who is the highest ranking individual 
in that team. 
-  
Variables Definition Coding  
Core founder An individual who comes up 
with the idea of creating the 
organization and suggests the 
earliest outline of the venture 
0= Non-Core founder 
1= Core founder 
CEO Job title: CEO/ Executive 
director/ Managing director/Other 
title represents the highest 
position in the venture 
0= Non-CEO 
1= CEO 
 
2. Commercial experience  
a. Definition: prior working experiences at commercial companies. 
i. Commercial company: A company that has to follow normal 
accepted business practices and operates in order to make a profit 
(From Longman Business Dictionary) 
 
 
 
Coding Guideline 
Please thoroughly read given materials (Echoing Green Profile, LinkedIn Profile, 
Articles) about each founding team member, founding team, and venture, and code 
the applicable information on the given excel spreadsheet.  
1. Read the description of each concept and understand it before you start 
coding. 
2. I have provided examples of the coding of three ventures and venture teams.  
Please examine those to see how the coding works.   
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Variables Definition  Coding 
CE_Month Months spent on working at 
commercial companies 
Number (0~N) 
CE_Type Nature of work experiences at 
commercial companies;  
(Check all that apply) or  
(Write down all applicable 
numbers) 
 
1= Venture capital experience 
2= Financial experience 
3= Senior management 
experience 
4= Consulting experience 
5= Entrepreneurial experience-
founder of a commercially 
motivated firm 
6= Entrepreneurial experience- 
employee of a commercially 
motivated firm (startup) 
7= Employee of a 
commercially motivated firm 
(non-startup) 
8= Others 
CE_Background 
(Column 1,2,3) 
Function of work experiences at 
commercial companies  
 
(In the ‘CE_background_1 
column, report the most recent 
experience, to CE_background_2 
the second most recent, and so 
forth) 
1= Production and Operations 
2= R&D and Engineering 
3= Accounting and Finance 
4= Management and 
Administration 
5= Marketing and Sales 
6= Law 
7= Personnel and Labor 
relations 
8= Others 
CE_F500 Had worked at least one Fortune 
500 company 
(Use this link for assessment: 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/) 
 
1= Yes 0= No 
CE_Serial The number of commercial 
companies an individual has 
founded in the past 
Number (0~N) 
 
3. Social experience  
a. Definition: prior working experiences at organizations with a primary 
social aim (a non-profit, for profit, or hybrid) 
 
Variables Definition Coding 
SE_Month Months spent on working at 
organizations with a primary social 
aim 
Number (0~N) 
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SE_Type Nature of work experiences at 
organizations with a primary social 
aim 
(Check all that apply) or 
(Write down all applicable numbers) 
 
  
1= Social venture capital 
(SVC) or Philanthropic 
venture capital (PhVC) 
experience 
2=Senior management 
experience at an 
organization with a 
primary social aim 
3= Experiences working 
for the government or 
government agencies 
4= Entrepreneurial 
experience-founder of an 
organization with a 
primary social aim 
5= Entrepreneurial 
experience- employee of 
an organization with a 
primary social aim 
(startup) 
6= Employee of an 
organization with a 
primary social aim (non-
startup) 
7= Others 
SE_Background 
(Column 1,2,3) 
Function of working experiences at 
organizations with a primary social 
aim  
(In the ‘SE_background_1 column, 
report the most recent experience, to 
SE_background_2 the second most 
recent, and so forth) 
1= Production and 
Operations 
2= R&D and Engineering 
3= Accounting and 
Finance 
4= Management and 
Administration 
5= Marketing and Sales 
6= Law 
7= Personnel and Labor 
relations 
8= Others 
SE_Scope The regional scope of the organization 
with a primary social aim  
(Check all that apply) or 
(Write down all applicable numbers) 
 
1= Local 
2= National 
3= Global 
SE_Serial The number of organizations with a 
primary social aim that an individual 
has founded in past 
Number (0~N) 
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4. Research experience  
a. Definition: Prior research experience at an educational institution (mostly 
at University) 
Variables Definition Coding 
RE_Month Months spent on working as an 
independent researcher/research 
assistant at an educational institution 
Number (0~N) 
RE_ Institution Educational institution that an 
individual conducted a research at/ 
Sponsor of the research program 
(Check all that apply) or 
(Write down all applicable numbers) 
 
0= None 
1= High school 
2= University 
3= Government 
4= Others 
RE_Elite School An individual conducted research at 
an elite school3 
 (Use the school where an individual 
most recently worked for this 
assessment) 
0= Non-elite school  
1= Elite school 
 
5. Balanced entrepreneurs 
 
Variables Definition Coding 
Balanced 
entrepreneur 
He or she had more than 12 months 
of work experiences in both 
commercial and social area. 
0= Non-balanced 
entrepreneur 
1=Balanced entrepreneur 
 
6. Demographic information 
Variables Coding 
Gender 0=Male, 1= Female 
Age Year of undergraduate college graduation  
(e.g. Class of 2018→ Write down 2018)  
                                                 
3 See A for the list of elite schools 
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Undergrad major (Column 
1, 2) 
 
(Identify the individual’s 
major or the first listed of 
several majors and enter 
that in UG_M-1; if the 
individual had a minor, or a 
second major, enter that in 
column UG_M-2) 
0=None 
1=Computer science/mathematics 
2=Life sciences (agricultural and food, biological, and 
environmental life sciences) 
3=Physical sciences (chemistry except biochemistry, 
earth science, geology, oceanography, physics, and 
astronomy) 
4=Social sciences (economics, political science, 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology) 
5=Engineering (aerospace, chemical, civil and 
architectural, electrical, industrial, and mechanical) 
6=Humanities (languages, literatures, philosophy, 
religion) 
7=Arts 
8=Law 
9=Medical 
10=Business administration (finance, accounting, 
management, marketing, entrepreneurship) 
 
  
Undergrad elite school4 0= Non-elite university  
1= Elite university 
Grad major (Column 1, 2)  
 
(Identify the individual’s 
major or the first listed of 
several majors and enter 
that in GS_M-1; if the 
individual had a minor, or a 
second major, enter that in 
column GS_M-2)  
0=None 
1=Computer science/mathematics 
2=Life sciences (agricultural and food, biological, and 
environmental life sciences) 
3=Physical sciences (chemistry except biochemistry, 
earth science, geology, oceanography, physics, and 
astronomy) 
4=Social sciences (economics, political science, 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology) 
5=Engineering (aerospace, chemical, civil and 
architectural, electrical, industrial, and mechanical) 
6=Humanities (languages, literatures, philosophy, 
religion) 
7=Arts 
8=Law 
9=Medical 
10=Business administration (finance, accounting, 
management, marketing, entrepreneurship) 
 
Grad elite school5 0= Non-elite university  
1= Elite university  
                                                 
4 See A for the list of elite schools. 
5 See A for the list of elite schools. 
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Highest level of completed 
education 
0=None 
1=High school 
2=Community college 
3=Bachelor 
4=Master 
5=Higher professional degrees 
Professional degree 
 
0=None 
1=Medical doctor (M.D.); Doctor of Dental Surgery 
(DDS) 
2=MBA  
3=Juris Doctor (J.D.) 
4=The Master of Laws (LL.M.) 
5= Doctor of Theology (ThD) 
(Check all that apply) 
 
Nationality 1= United States 
2= North America outside of US 
3= Latin America  
4= Africa 
5= Asia-Pacific 
6=Europe  
7= Middle East 
Race/Ethnicity 1= White 
0= Others 
 
7. Primary motivation of engaging in social entrepreneurship 
 
Variables Coding 
Motivation that primarily 
drives formation of the 
current social venture6 
0= No personal experience with the social problem 
1= Having specific personal experiences with social 
problem 
 
 
 
 
8. Team-level variables 
Variables Coding 
Founding team size Number of founders 
 
                                                 
6 See B for details. 
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9. Venture-level variables 
Variables Coding  
Country Country the social venture operates in 
Model 0= Hybrid 1=For-profit 
Issue Area 1= Arts & Culture 
2= Civil & Human rights 
3= Education 
4= Environment 
5= Food & Agriculture 
6= Health & Healthcare 
7= Poverty alleviation & Economic development 
8= Public service & Civic engagement 
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A: Elite Education Institutions (Finkelstein, Academy of Management Journal, 
1992) 
Amherst College, Brown University, Carleton College, Columbia University, Cornell 
University, Dartmouth College, Grinnell College, Harvard University, Haverford 
College, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of technology, New York 
University, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Pomona College, Princeton 
University, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, United States Military Academy, 
United States Naval Academy, University of California, Berkeley, University of 
California, Los Angeles, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, University of 
Pennsylvania, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, Williams College, Yale 
University 
 
B: Motivation that primarily drives formation of the current venture (Adapted from 
Yitshaki & Kropp, Journal of Small Business Management, 2015) 
• Coding  
0= No personal experience with the social problem 
1= Having Specific personal experiences with the social problem 
• Concept 
o Social Entrepreneurs (SEs) in this category connect their motivations to 
emotional life events in the past or the present. The SEs experienced pain 
in the past, and each created a social venture that would help alleviate 
others from experiencing pain, shame, abuse, or confusion that they had 
experienced. They want to help individuals in similar circumstances. 
• Examples 
o A SE who developed a venture for educating disabled children: “My 
middle daughter suffers from cerebral palsy. Due to my disappointment 
with the national bureaucracy I decided that somebody should do 
something in order to assist parents of such children to cope with the 
difficulties.”  
 
o A SE who established a venture to support new immigrant families who 
became drug addicts as a result of her own experience: “look for women 
that experienced similar problem… I decided to organize them because 
when you are alone you are vulnerable but if you are unified as a group, 
you have power.”  
 
o A SE who established a venture to empower women through 
entrepreneurship education said her experience as a young divorced 
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women guided her: “I thought that everything a woman needed is love… 
and then I found myself alone… I could never be active in this field 
without my experience… entrepreneurship can empower women… I 
transferred that love I had in my previous life to other women, to internal 
love.” “I invest in my volunteers as if they were my best friends… it is 
like I am compensating myself from where I was hurt and I had a chance 
to correct it.” (From Yitshaki & Kropp, 2015) 
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